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I. INTRODUCTION 
State judiciaries are responsible for the resolution and disposition of 
the vast majority of civil and criminal cases in the United States.1  Yet 
 
* Copyright © 2008, 2009 by Keith R. Fisher.  All Rights Reserved.  This article is a synthesis of 
the author’s work to date on the subject of Introductory Judiciary Education.  Small portions of this 
article were drafted by the author for inclusion in the Report and Recommendations of the Ohio Bar 
Association and the ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence on Introductory Judicial 
Education to the ABA House of Delegates and an Amicus Brief filed by the ABA (of which the 
author was also the principal draftsman) in the U.S. Supreme Court Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co.   A substantial portion of this article is derived from a white paper written by the author for a 
Symposium on Pre-Judicial Education hosted by the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law 
and co-sponsored by the Ohio State Bar and the Standing Committee on Judicial Independence. 
** A.B. Princeton University, J.D. Georgetown University.    Professor Fisher is currently serving 
as the Reporter for the new ABA 20/20 Ethics Commission and as Reporter for the Judicial 
Disqualification Project of the Standing Committee on Judicial Independence.  The author would 
like to express his appreciation to Roy Schotland, Doreen Dodson, William Weisenberg, and 
Konstantina Vagenas for their insights and encouragement and to Franklin Pierce Law Center, 
Concord, New Hampshire, for a generous writing stipend.   
 1. According to the National Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia, 98 percent 
of all judicial proceedings in the United States occur in state courts.  See National Center for State 
Courts, Court Administration: Caseflow Management, http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/CourTopics/ 
overview.asp?topic=CasMan (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).  Justice Breyer has reportedly put the 
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public confidence in the court system has greatly diminished and 
continues to wane, and criticism of the quality of individual judges and 
the judiciary as a whole is ubiquitous.2  Judges themselves have 
evidenced their dissatisfaction by voluntarily doffing their robes and 
leaving the bench in ever-increasing numbers.3   
The crisis in our judicial system has many causes, but one recurring 
theme has been that most judges are ill-prepared for the challenges, 
personal and professional, of a judicial career, and many of them turn 
out to be ill-suited for the job.  On February 16, 2009, the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association (ABA) voted 
overwhelmingly to approve a resolution and recommendation urging 
state high courts and state, local, and territorial bar associations to 
establish voluntary programs of Introductory Judicial Education.4  Such 
programs would enable individuals interested in serving on the judiciary 
to obtain, well in advance of any selection or election process in which 
they might become involved, a better appreciation of the role of the 
judiciary and the myriad of challenges judges face both on and off the 
bench.  Armed with that education, a judicial aspirant would be not only 
better prepared to serve as a judge but also in a far better position to 
make an informed decision about whether to pursue a judicial career in 
the first place.   
This article will consider the concept of Introductory Judicial 
Education, its underlying rationale and purpose, and the possible 
curricular content of such a program.   
II.  JUDGING AS A SEPARATE PROFESSION 
The word “professionalism,” now widely used in discourse about 
the condition and future of the legal profession, may conjure different 
 
figure at 95 percent.  See Dorothy Samuels, The Selling of the Judiciary: Campaign Cash “in the 
Courtroom”, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at A22.   
 2. See infra notes 157-189. 
 3. See infra note 105. 
 4. The Recommendation and Resolution, No. 113, was sponsored by the ABA Standing 
Committee on Judicial Independence and co-sponsored or supported by the ABA Judicial Division, 
the Lawyers Conference, the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges, the National 
Conference of State Trial Judges, the Appellate Judges Conference, the Ohio State Bar Association, 
the Mississippi Bar, the ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection, the ABA Center on Ethnic 
and Racial Diversity, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, the National Conference of Federal 
Trial Judges, the San Diego County Bar Association, the National Judicial College, and the 
American Judicature Society. 
2
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connotations to different people.5  Putting such nuances aside, the word 
does denote a certain quality of conduct that is expected by members of 
the profession and lay people alike.  Applying the concept of 
professionalism not just to the bar but to the judiciary as well seems 
entirely appropriate, particularly given the increasing frequency and 
severity of attacks on judges6 and on judicial conduct.  These include 
perennial critiques of judicial sentences7 and orders granting motions to 
suppress8 in criminal cases, petulant (if not choleric) insistence by 
former governors George Pataki of New York and Gray Davis of 
California that decisions by their judicial appointees should reflect 
 
 5. “Indeed, it seems clear that the word professionalism means different things to different 
people, and it is often used in different ways by the same people, sometimes at the same time and in 
the same context.”  Barry Sullivan & Ellen S. Podgor, Respect, Responsibility, and the Virtue of 
Introspection: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law School Environment, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 117, 121 (2001).   
 6. The reference here is not to physical attacks, though these too have escalated.  See Jerry 
Markon, Besieged by Threats, Judges Seek Security [as] Intimidation of Court Personnel Has 
Surged Recently, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 2009, at 16 (“[t]he threats against federal court personnel 
have more than doubled in the past six years, from 592 to 1,278”). See, e.g., Amanda Paulson & 
Patrik Jonsson, How Judges Cope with Everyday Threats on the Job, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Mar. 4, 2005; Rick Lyman, Focus on Safety for Judges Outside the Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
11, 2005, at A18; Shaila Dewan, Terror in Atlanta: The Overview; Suspect Kills 3, Including Judge, 
at Atlanta Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at A1; Sniper Shoots Judge in Reno Courthouse, CHI. 
TRIB., June 13, 2006, § 1, at 6.  More recently, a radio commentator was charged with threatening 
the lives of three federal judges and was committed for trial on those charges notwithstanding his 
claim to First Amendment protection for “rhetorical hyperbole.”  See Lynne Marek, Trial Over 
Death Threats Against Federal Judges Could Test Free Speech Rules Online, NAT’L L. REV, Nov. 
24, 2009. 
 7. Relatively recent examples are Bill O’Reilly’s critiques of Oklahoma judge Thomas 
Bartheld (also criticized by Geraldo Rivera) for imposing a one-year sentence on convicted child 
molester for rape and sodomy of a five-year old girl, see Kandra Wells, O’Reilly, Rivera, Take 
Bartheld, Miller to Task on National TV, MCALESTER NEWS CAPITAL, June 6, 2009, 
http://www.mcalesternews.com/local/local_story_157175737.html, and of Vermont judges Edward 
Cashman and David Howard.  See Bill O’Reilly, Talking Points: No Justice in Vermont (Jan. 16, 
2007), available at  http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,243904,00.html.    
 8. A prime example is the notorious 1996 Presidential campaign issue (and intimidating 
threats of impeachment) arising from such an order by Judge Harold Baer in United States v. 
Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  See 
generally Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at A1; 
Linda Greenhouse, Judges as Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at A1; Don Van Natta, 
Jr., Judges Defend a Colleague from Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at B1; R. Eugene 
Pincham, Commentary, A New Tyranny Against Judiciary, CHI. TRIB., May 23, 1996, at 30.  During 
this imbroglio, Judge Baer did receive support from his judicial colleagues within the Second 
Circuit, who wrote a letter decrying politicians’ public castigation of judges for their opinions and 
the concomitant threat to the independence of Article III judges.  See Second Circuit Chief Judges 
Criticize Attacks on Judge Baer, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 1996, at 4. 
3
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gubernatorial  views,9 castigation of judicial consideration of foreign 
sources of law when interpreting the Constitution or federal statutes,10 
generalized attacks on U.S. Supreme Court decisions from both sides of 
the political spectrum as (with apologies to Tennyson11) cannon to the 
right and left of them volley and thunder,12 generic legislative dyspepsia 
over instances of “judicial activism,”13  legislative threats of jurisdiction 
stripping,14 and, from the lunatic fringe, “J.A.I.L. 4 Judges.”15  While 
one would like to believe that purely political motives16 or fundamental 
differences in deeply-held philosophical or religious beliefs account for 
most such fusillades, it cannot be gainsaid that a great many complaints 
are, in fact, meritorious (with some potentially rising to the level of 
 
 9. See Juan Gonzalez, Pols Rule Courtrooms: Acting Judges Owe Their Job to Pataki, Rudy, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2000, at 8; Davis’ Remarks Leave Judges’ Heads Shaking, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 2, 2000. 
 10.  See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (disapproving Supreme Court’s use of this 
technique in cases such as Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and Atkins v. Virgina, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002)).   
 11.  See ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON, The Charge of the Light Brigade (1854), in TENNYSON: 
SELECTED POETRY 96 (W.E. Williams, ed. 1985).   
 12.  Compare Vincent T. Bugliosi, None Dare Call It Treason, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 11 
(criticizing the Supreme Court majority in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)) with Joan Biskupic, 
Bork, Uncorked; The Judge Holds the Supreme Court in Contempt, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1997, at 
C01 (highlighting Judge Bork’s criticisms of the Supreme Court).   
 13. See, e.g., Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and Its Impact, Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, U.S. Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (June 11, 1997); Warren Richey, Judicial Aftershocks from the Schiavo 
Case, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 4, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/ 
0404/p02s01-usju.html?s=hns; Judicious Temperament: Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor Speaks Up Against Political Attacks on Courts, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 16, 2006, at 
B18. 
 14. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF 
POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 57 (1997); Ralph Jimenez, Judges, Lawyers Decry the 
Virulence of Attacks on High Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, N.H. WKLY., Oct. 4, 1998, at 1.   
 15. See Claire Cooper, Bid to Punish Judges Has Eye on State, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 17, 
2005, at A3. 
 16. See, e.g., Ralph Z. Hallow, Republicans Out to Impeach ‘Activist’ Jurists, WASH. TIMES, 
Mar. 12, 1997, at A1; The Constitution Project, Report of the Citizens for Independent Courts Task 
Force on the Distinction Between Intimidation & Legitimate Criticism of Judges, Defending 
Justice: Courts, Criticism and Intimidation, in UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S 
COURTS 121, 146-47 (2000), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/ 
uncertain_justice.pdf. 
4
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criminal misconduct17) and keep state judicial conduct commissions in 
business.18    
Invoking professionalism with respect to the judiciary raises the 
question whether “judging” can be regarded as a separate profession 
from “lawyering.”  Taking an essentially instrumentalist approach to 
defining what constitutes a profession, courts have identified certain 
salient characteristics, including, at a minimum, formal training, 
licensing standards, and enforceable ethics codes.19  As the New York 
Court of Appeals has observed:  
A profession is not a business.  It is distinguished by the requirements 
of extensive formal training and learning, admission to practice by a 
qualifying licensure, a code of ethics imposing standards qualitatively 
and extensively beyond those that prevail or are tolerated in the 
marketplace, a system for discipline of its members for violation of the 
code of ethics, a duty to subordinate financial reward to social 
responsibility, and, notably, an obligation on its members, even in non-
professional matters, to conduct themselves as members of a learned, 
disciplined, and honorable occupation.20  
For their part, social scientists have also endeavored to identify the 
principal characteristics that distinguish professions from other 
occupations.  These include:   
• a substantial body of knowledge, essential to performing the tasks 
of the occupation and requiring mastery of abstract concepts and 
complex principles unfamiliar to the population at large; 
• self-regulation by means of established and enforceable standards 
for ethical behavior of practitioners; 
 
 17. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of Judicial Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1231 (1997).  Cf. Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Prosecuting 
Judges for Ethical Violations: Are Criminal Sanctions Constitutional and Prudent, or Do They 
Constitute a Threat to Judicial Independence?, 33 FORDHAM URB.  L.J. 727 (2006). 
 18. See infra notes 150-180 and accompanying text.  See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 432-56 (2004). 
  Civil suits against judges are more problematic because of judicial immunity.  Recently, 
two Luzerne County, Pennsylvania judges were accused of taking kickbacks in return for sending 
juveniles to privately owned detention facilities.  A federal court ruled that one of the judges was 
immune from damages for the vast majority of his conduct, as it occurred inside a courtroom, while 
the other judge, whose actions were more administrative in nature, such as signing a placement 
agreement with the detention center, did not enjoy immunity.  See Ashby Jones, New Lawsuits Try 
to Pierce Shield of Judicial Immunity, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2009. 
 19. E.g., Hosp. Comp. Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D.N.J. 
1992). 
 20. In re Estate of Freeman (Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Freeman), 311 N.E.2d 480 (N.Y. 
1974). 
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• self-regulation of the conditions and content of the work performed, 
providing a high level of  individual autonomy; 
• a culture emphasizing a strong and enduring level of dedication to 
the work;  
• identification with the occupation by practitioners and a sharing of 
common interests and values;   
• a motivational ideal of service to clients and the public: While a 
business chiefly seeks financial profit, a profession is mainly 
concerned with the ideal of service.21  
“Judging,” it should be noted, encompasses all of these except 
formal training and learning beyond and different from what is required 
for admission to the practice of law, i.e., prior education or credentialing 
that is peculiar to the task of being a judge.   
The foregoing array of formal characteristics—particularly the 
educational requirements, licensing requirements, and ethical code—
engenders a degree of trust and dependency that creates the fiduciary 
obligations said to be owed by professionals to their clients and, to a 
degree, the public as well.22  In the case of judges, that duty translates 
into obligations of fidelity to the law, integrity, fairness, impartiality, and 
adherence to a quasi-Aristotelian notion that like cases will be treated 
alike.  Whether judicial selection is made by election or appointment, 
“there is an implied covenant with the people that the judges selected 
will be persons who have demonstrated by well-defined and well-
recognized qualifications their fitness for judicial office”—a covenant 
that includes “find[ing] persons . . . qualified by learning, experience and 
temperament, to decide the cases that come before them impartially and 
in accordance with the law.”23   
The vast majority of people serving in the judiciary have no special 
credentials for the judicial role that set them apart from lawyers in 
general.  Thus, other than a law school education, bar passage, and some 
amount of experience in the practice of law (typically, though not 
 
 21. See RONALD M.  PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 19-33 (2d 
ed. 1988).  Omitted from this enumeration, because it is not germane to the topic of this essay, is a 
darker, corollary characteristic of a profession—that of being a cartel, able to monopolize the 
provision of a particular type of service.  See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 17-30 
(1986). 
 22. See Richard A. Glaser & Leslee M. Lewis, Redefining the Professional: The Policies and 
Unregulated Development of Consultant Malpractice Liability, 72 U. DET. MERCY. L. REV. 563, 
573-80 (1995). 
 23. James J. Alfini and Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in State Judicial 
Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 701 (2002). 
6
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always, as litigators), there is no special training given to those who 
aspire to judicial office prior to their ascendancy to the bench.24   
In recent years, suggestions have been made for a special 
curriculum for individuals aspiring to judicial office.  Under the aegis of 
the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Judicial 
Independence (“SCJI” or the “Committee”),25 a Study Group on Pre-
Judicial Education—which is now called “Introductory Judicial 
Education” or “IJE”26—was empanelled in 200127 and in 2005 issued a 
brief but interesting report.28  The idea of IJE is that some sort of formal 
 
 24. A variety of programs are offered for those who are already judges.  Some prominent 
examples are (1) the courses developed and offered by the National Judicial College in Reno, Nev. 
(principally targeted at state trial and family court judges), see generally The National Judicial 
College, http://www.judges.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2009), and (2) those offered in an orientation 
program for new federal judges offered by the Federal Judicial Center (principally covering civil 
and criminal trial practice, case management, judicial ethics, opinion writing, and (for district judges 
and magistrate judges) the criminal sentencing process, as well as discrete areas of substantive law 
that arise frequently in federal practice), see THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EDUCATION AND 
RESEARCH FOR THE U.S. FEDERAL COURTS, at 2, available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/FJCEdRes.pdf/$file/FJCEdRes.pdf. 
 25.  The Standing Committee on Judicial Independence has taken a leadership role in 
promoting public trust and confidence in the judiciary as well as in the justice system more 
generally, including such recent efforts as the DVD video program.  Protecting Our Rights, 
Protecting Our Courts, the pro-judicial independence pamphlets Countering the Critics, Countering 
the Critics II, and Rapid Response to Unjust and Unfair Criticism of Judges, and the Least 
Understood Branch project. 
 26.  Born, no doubt, of a classical education, but influenced further by a culture in which 
sound bytes are everything, the author’s initial reaction to the term “Pre-Judicial Education” was 
decidedly unfavorable.  One is simply asking too much of that little hyphen, and it can’t bear the 
load!  For whether or not one ends up, as a substantive matter, being a proponent of some sort of 
special education for aspiring judges, the term “Pre-Judicial” smacks too much of “prejudicial”; 
indeed, that is the Latin etymology of words such as “prejudicial” and “prejudice,” and from a 
psychological perspective there is a strong possibility that the host of negative contemporary 
connotations attached to those words, not only in legal discourse specifically but also in modern 
English usage generally, would subconsciously damn the concept before it even gets a fair hearing.  
That, after all, is the essence of what it means to be “prejudicial”—with or without the hyphen.   
  The alternative, “ante-judicial,” is no better, not merely because it sounds a bit precious, 
rather like “ante bellum”—redolent as that is with mental visions of plantations and privileged 
persons sipping mint juleps on honeysuckle-scented verandas—but also because it suffers from the 
potential of homonymous confusion with “anti-judicial,” a category of sentiment that is, as noted 
above (see supra notes 6-16), already far too prevalent in our society.   
  Accordingly, though begging the reader’s indulgence for this footnote, the author intends 
to use the phrase “Introductory Judicial Education” or its acronym “IJE” to describe any and all 
possible variations on a curriculum or training program for individuals who aspire to judicial office, 
whether trial-level or appellate, and whether federal, state, or administrative. 
 27.  The Study Group comprised trial and appellate judges, lawyers, judicial and adult 
educators, bar association executives, and legal academics. 
 28.  See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, 
REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON PRE-JUDICIAL EDUCATION (2005) [hereinafter Study Group 
Report]. 
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preparation, while neither a prerequisite for judicial office nor a 
guarantee of selection, will result in a cadre of potential jurists who have 
exhibited the interest and the commitment to acquire an extra 
educational credential that potentially could make them better qualified 
for the judiciary than other lawyers.   
As part of this effort, the Study Group necessarily had to address 
the issue whether the effectiveness and perception of legitimacy of 
judicial selection might be enhanced through the establishment of a 
program of Introductory Judicial Education. This involved consideration 
of the form such education might take, how its availability might affect 
the pool of potential judges and assist those responsible for judicial 
selection, and the potential long-range impact of such education on the 
overall functioning of our system of justice.   
 As the Study Group observed: 
What we envision is not the displacement of existing selection 
mechanisms, but rather their enhancement by making available to 
potential judges educational programs designed to produce judicial 
candidates who are better prepared for the role and who can make a 
more informed decision regarding whether a judicial career is 
appropriate for them.  Education of this sort would prove useful to 
those responsible for judicial selection—whether an electorate or an 
appointive authority—by providing a significant piece of information 
regarding the interest level and aptitude of the candidates.  The 
candidates themselves would benefit from attaining a better 
appreciation of the judicial role.  Changes in the nature of law practice 
and the judicial role over the past several decades have rendered the 
gap between the two activities increasingly large.  Lawyers are less 
able to appreciate all of what being a judge entails, and the skills 
learned in practice are less directly applicable to a judicial role that 
now includes a substantial managerial component.  Because of this, we 
believe that [IJE] programs would also appeal to practitioners who do 
not intend to become judges, but who could benefit from knowing 
more about judicial roles and responsibilities. . . . 
 
While we do not believe that [IJE] stands as a cure for all the problems 
of judicial selection, we believe that it can alleviate many of them.  For 
example, candidates who have undergone [IJE] will be less likely to 
engage in unethical or otherwise inappropriate campaign conduct.  
More generally, as already suggested, they are likely to be better 
candidates both because their education will make them better judges 
and because their decision to seek a judgeship will be more informed.  
In addition, just as education has traditionally served as a gateway to 
opportunity in American society, so can [IJE] open judicial careers to 
8
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those who might otherwise been [sic] excluded from pursuing them 
based on, for instance, a lack of political involvement.  In sum, [IJE] 
presents the possibility of creating a larger pool of better-prepared 
potential judges.29 
The Study Group also identified some possible negative 
externalities: 
. . . To the extent that [IJE] involves significant costs, career 
interruption, or geographic relocation, some otherwise suitable 
candidates are likely to be discouraged from pursuing judgeships.  In 
addition, there is some reason for concern regarding whether these 
effects would fall more heavily on women and those in public service 
or other less remunerative practice areas.  These effects are, of course, 
speculative, but nonetheless deserve ongoing attention as the concept 
of [IJE] moves forward.30   
After examining a variety of resources and programs, the Study 
Group concluded that “[IJE] presents a viable and valuable avenue for 
improving both appointive and elective systems of judicial selection.”31  
Acknowledging that the concept was “largely uncharted territory,” the 
Study Group suggested certain additional preliminary steps that might be 
(but have not, to date, been) taken.  These include compiling “data 
regarding the specific sorts of information that would be most valuable 
to those considering a judicial career,”32 developing data on “the typical 
background of those who become state court judges,”33 and 
experimenting with pilot programs.34  As a concept, Introductory 
 
 29.  Id. at 4-5. 
 30.  Id. at 5. 
 31.  Id. at 29.   
 32.  Id. 
Both new and experienced judges should be systematically surveyed regarding what they 
wish they had known at the outset of their judicial careers.  The practicing bar might 
likewise be surveyed concerning the perceived strengths and deficiencies of both new 
and experienced judges.  In addition, because making the programs useful to 
practitioners as well as aspiring judges will be critical to their success, attention must be 
paid to the bar’s views of what its members would find most useful and interesting. 
Id.  
 33.  Id. at 29.  
Such data would provide an additional window into the experiential gaps of the 
judiciary, and thereby suggest areas of curricular emphasis that might not be apparent 
from other studies.  In addition, the data might reveal that there are categories of lawyers 
who are relatively under-represented in the judiciary, and perhaps suggest ways in which 
education might be shaped to make them more likely to consider becoming a judge. 
Id.   
 34.  Id. at 29-30. 
Given the novelty of [IJE], it will be critical to begin by taking small steps.  We believe 
9
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Judicial Education is largely unobjectionable and may well merit 
enthusiastic support from the organized bar, which has an interest in 
maximizing the chances that the most highly qualified individuals will 
ascend to the bench.35  The devil is in the details, however.  What, for 
example, would be the intended scope of such a program?  Would it be a 
relatively short, seminar-like program, lasting a week or less?  Would it 
be a formal, degree program requiring a year of full-time study in 
residence, much like a typical LL.M. curriculum?  What sorts of subjects 
would comprise an IJE curriculum?   
The topic thus rather naturally subdivides itself into two 
fundamental questions.  Is there a sufficiently strong case to be made for 
IJE?  If so, what might be envisioned as the substantive curriculum?  
In considering these questions, we have the luxury—and the 
challenge—of writing on a nearly clean slate.  Canvassing the law 
review literature reveals very little of substance on the subject of judicial 
education36 generally and even less on IJE.  Indeed, the latter boasts only 
two offerings, one by a former Director of the A.B.A.’s Judicial 
Division37 and the other by a judge of the Louisiana Court of Appeal, 
Third Circuit.38  Beyond these, the only publication to date has been the 
Study Group Report.39   
Before turning to the merits of IJE, a few more introductory 
observations are in order.  The impetus for considering this topic can be 
traced back to a lingering unease with judicial selection and the ongoing 
(though by now somewhat stagnant) debate over merit selection.40  
 
that an appropriate jurisdiction should be identified for the implementation of a pilot 
program, the initial design of which should be such as to permit flexibility to adapt in 
light of early results.  More generally, we believe that broad experimentation will be 
necessary to determine what is workable and useful, and that such experimentation 
should be fostered and encouraged.  From there, work can begin to develop generalized 
standards, and perhaps the formation of an institute devoted solely to [IJE]. 
Id.   
 35.  Id. at 6.  Problems with judicial selection appeared to the Study Group to be “most acute” 
at the state level, so its inquiry was limited to the IJE for aspirants to state judiciaries.  Id.  Even 
conceding the correctness of the protasis, it seems sensible to assume that if IJE is worthwhile, it 
will be equally useful to aspirants for both state and federal judicial office.   
 36.  I.e., continuing education for those who have already ascended to the bench.   
 37.  Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851 (2002).   
 38.  Marc T. Amy, Judiciary School: A Proposal for a Pre-Judicial LL.M. Degree, 52 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 130 (2002).  This article is an adaptation of Judge Amy’s thesis for the degree of 
LL.M. in Judicial Process at the University of Virginia School of Law.   
 39.  Study Group Report, supra note 28.    
 40.  With 39 of the 50 states relying on some form of election to select judicial officers, that 
phenomenon, which dates back to the eighteenth century (see infra note 41) and took wing with 
19th century populist concerns about cronyism in judicial appointments, is not likely to vanish in 
the foreseeable future.  Nonetheless, the media occasionally takes the opportunity to editorialize 
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Those concerns date back at least to the era of the drafting of the federal 
Constitution41 and began to ferment in the Jacksonian era,42 possibly as a 
result of populist dissatisfaction with the appointment of judges 
perceived to be political cronies of the party in power, though this is 
disputed.43  What is undisputed is that the mid-nineteenth century 
witnessed a move toward elective judiciaries in many states,44 followed 
in the twentieth century by the realization that the taint of politics is just 
 
(even in what are supposed to be news stories) in favor of merit selection.  See, e.g., Editorial, 
Justice for Sale?, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2009, at A12 (“[S]tates should consider abolishing judicial 
elections in favor of an appointment system that distances jurists from politics and fundraising.”); 
Samuels, supra note 1 (noting “inappropriate judicial involvement in partisan politics,” the “dawn 
of a grubby new era of multimillion-dollar campaigns for important state judgeships,” and referring 
with approval to “state reformers stepping up their call for . . . a switch to a nonelective merit 
selection system.”).  Even justices of the U.S. Supreme Court cannot resist commenting on the 
judicial election phenomenon.  See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787 (2002) 
(noting ABA’s historical preference of merit selection over judicial elections); id. at 782 (“[I]f, as 
Justice Ginsburg claims, it violates due process for a judge to sit in a case in which ruling one way 
rather than another increases his prospects for reelection, then—quite simply—the practice of 
electing judges is itself a violation of due process.”); id. at 788-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(expressing serious reservations about judicial elections generally and noting concerns about 
campaign contributions undermining public confidence in the judiciary). 
There is general consensus that the design of the Federal Constitution, including lifetime 
tenure and appointment by nomination and confirmation, has preserved the 
independence of the Federal judiciary.  In resolving this case, however, we should 
refrain from criticism of the State’s choice to use open elections to select those persons 
most likely to achieve judicial excellence. 
Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 41.  “Judicial elections began in 1789 in Georgia localities, then in 1793 in Vermont 
localities, and in 1812 Georgia adopted it for state judges.”  Roy A. Schotland, To The Endangered 
Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1399 (2003) 
(citations omitted).   
 42.  See, e.g., Luke Bierman, Preserving Power in Picking Judges: Merit Selection for the 
New York Court of Appeals, 60 ALB. L. REV. 339, 342-49 (1996) (alluding to such historical 
developments in the context of tracing the evolution of judicial selection for New York’s high 
court).   
 43. The choice of elections was not (as myth holds): 
[A]n unthinking ‘emotional response’ rooted in . . . Jacksonian Democracy” which 
somehow “assumed that popular election of judges constituted a radical measure 
intended to break judicial power through an infusion of popular will and majority 
control.”  On the contrary, the move to judicial elections was led by moderate lawyer-
delegates to increase judicial independence and stature.  Their goal was a judiciary “free 
from the corrosive effects of politics and able to restrain legislative power. 
Schotland, supra note 41, at 1400 (citing Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State 
Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 44 HISTORIAN 337 (1983)). 
See also Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanation for the Rise of the Elective 
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993); David B. Frohnmayer, Who’s 
to Judge?, 58 OR. ST. B. BULL. No. 2, 9, 10 (1997).   
 44.  See JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 97 (1950); 
Schotland, supra note 41, at 1399-1400.   
11
Fisher: Education for Judicial Aspirants
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
FISHER AA 1.11.10.DOC 1/14/2010  12:19 PM 
174 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:163 
as strong in elective regimes as in appointive regimes (and perhaps even 
stronger).  That realization has come home to roost in recent years with 
the advent of significant and highly controversial donations to 
candidates for judicial office45 and public perceptions of the implications 
for judicial independence.46   
Viewed in this context, IJE is perhaps another “take” on merit 
selection:47 An effort to maximize the chances that judicial selection—
by any process—will result in a judiciary composed of competent 
individuals who are not only philosophically attuned to the imperatives 
of fairness and impartiality (both in appearance and in fact) but capable 
of performing at a higher level of competence and efficiency as a result 
 
 45.  The most recent of these involves campaign support in excess of $3 million to a West 
Virginia high court judge  from the Chairman and CEO of a corporation after it had lost a $50 
million fraud verdict and while it was preparing to file an appeal to the same high court.  Justice for 
Sale?, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2009, at A12.  After winning a particularly contentious election, the 
judge in question, Brent D. Benjamin, refused to recuse himself, and with him as Acting Chief 
Justice, the court overturned the verdict by a one-vote margin (3-2).  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, (W. Va 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).  The former West Virginia Chief 
Justice, Elliott E. Maynard, had finally recused himself from the case after photographs surfaced of 
him being wined and dined on the French Riviera and Monaco by the same CEO; these revelations 
led to Maynard’s being defeated in the Democratic primary and losing his seat on the court.  Ian 
Urbina, West Virginia’s Top Judge Loses His Reelection Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2008, at A25; 
Paul J. Nyden, Mining Appeal Moving Along Olson to Argue Harman Case Before Supreme Court, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL (WV), May 16, 2008, at 1A.  On November 14, 2008, the 
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008).  
The granting of the writ had been unexpected, because in cases where judges had refused to recuse 
themselves in the face of large campaign contributions, the Supreme Court had previously denied 
certiorari three times.  See Avery v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005), 
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1003 (2006); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Wightman, 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987), 
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).   
  On June 8, 2009, a closely divided Court, while specifying that its holding was limited to 
the extreme facts of the case, held 5-4 that when one with a personal stake in a particular case has 
had a “disproportionate influence” in placing the judge on the case by the magnitude of campaign  
support when the case was pending or imminent, the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids the judge from hearing the case, regardless of whether the judge is or is not 
actually biased.  Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264-65 (2009).  (In the interests of full disclosure, the 
author was the principal draftsman of the American Bar Association’s amicus briefs, one at the 
certiorari stage and one at the merits stage, filed in the Caperton case).   
 46. See, e.g., David Goldberger, The Power of Special Interest Groups to Overwhelm Judicial 
Election Campaigns: The Troublesome Interaction Between the Code of Judicial Conduct, 
Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2003);   Aman Mcleod, If 
at First You Don't Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of Judicial Selection Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. 
L. REV. 499 (2005); Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-Partisan Judicial 
Campaigns: Protecting Judicial Independence While Ensuring Judicial Impartiality, 38 AKRON L. 
REV. 597 (2005).  
 47.  For some background on merit selection, see Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 
50th Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128 (1990).   
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of having received specialized training in the college of judicial arts and 
sciences.  IJE is not, however, a panacea for the ills of judicial selection, 
nor can it be:  As with the choice of judicial selection by election or by 
appointment, judicial selection with or without IJE can never be entirely 
insulated from partisan politics.48   
III. THE CASE FOR IJE 
A. Comparing the Common Law and Civil Law Approaches 
Some form of IJE is present in certain civil law systems.  Much 
could be, and has been, written on this subject.  While a detailed 
examination is beyond the scope of this article, some summary 
observations about a few such systems are offered here.  One 
fundamental characteristic is worth noting at the outset:  These civil law 
systems proceed from a set of premises radically different vis-a-vis the 
role of the judiciary, and how its members fit into the legal system 
overall, from those prevailing in the Anglo-American common law 
tradition.   
1. Germany 
The German system features a path embodying education for career 
judges.  As is common among European systems, legal education begins 
at what in the United States would be the undergraduate level.49  Legal 
education in Germany differs radically from the U.S. model both in the 
uniformity of the curriculum at German universities and in the degree of 
governmental regulation,50 at both the federal and state levels.51   
The Deutsches Richtersgesetz, or German Judges’ Law, prescribes 
the requirements for the study of law and establishes a regimen of state 
 
 48.  Cf. LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 128-30 (3d ed. 1994) 
(observing that merit selection does not eliminate political considerations from the process). 
 49.  Stefan Korioth, Legal Education in Germany Today, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 85, 90 (2006). 
 50.  Subjects of regulation include, inter alia, periods of study, vacations, mandatory and 
elective courses, state examinations, and grading.  See David S. Clark, The Selection and 
Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1795, 1802 (1988) (citing M. BRAUN, JURISTENAUSBILDUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND 67-113 (1980)).   
 51.  Since the founding of the German Reich in 1871, primary responsibility for oversight of 
legal education has rested with the states.  Nevertheless federal involvement, starting with the 1877 
Court Constitution Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz), has consistently prescribed the principle of the 
Einheitsjuristen (“standardized jurists,” i.e., the same qualification for all legal professions), a 
bifurcated qualification approach requiring passing two state examinations, and the notion of “the 
judge as a model for all jurists.”  Korioth, supra note 49, at 88.   
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testing for aspiring jurists.52  After passing the first examination, the 
student must complete a series of training rotations, each lasting from 
three to nine months in criminal court, civil court, a prosecutor’s office, 
an administrative agency, and a practicing lawyer’s office (plus one 
elective), while simultaneously taking courses that are taught by judges 
and civil servants and that focus on “the analysis of complex, practical 
cases.”53  Thus, a quintessentially judicial outlook predominates.54  
Thereafter, upon passing the second state examination, the student 
becomes a Volljurist (“full jurist”) and is eligible to apply for a 
judgeship.55  This approach to legal education, according to Dietrich 
Rueschmeyer, develops “‘a syndrome fostering civil service orientations 
and loyalty toward the State.’”56   
Originally designed for a small elite, this two-stage system with its 
mandatory training requirements now produces in excess of 100,000 law 
students,57 about 60 to 70 percent of whom will not become judges or 
public prosecutors because the German government limits the number of 
civil servants.58  The explosion of those embarking on judicial and legal 
careers59 has resulted in a glut of judges and Rechtsanwälte (practicing 
attorneys) and an increase in competition severe enough to affect, 
negatively, the quality of legal advice and services being rendered.60   
 
 52.  DEUTSCHES RICHTERGESETZ (“DRiG”), 1972 BGB1.I 713, as amended, § 5 I; 
Korioth, supra note 49, at 89 n.17 (2006) (“[t]oday's Federal Judge Act (Deutsches Richtergesetz) 
stipulates in Section 5 that ‘those who finish the study of legal sciences with the First State 
Examination and the subsequent preparatory service with the Second State Examination obtain the 
qualification for the office of a judge.’”). 
 53.  Clark, supra note 50, at 1804.   
 54.  The same can be said of the education on the Langdellian model purveyed to the vast 
majority of law students in the United States.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 228 (8th ed. 2004) 
(“casebook method”).  
 55.  However, this same curriculum produces prosecutors, government lawyers, and a broad 
array of in-house corporate lawyers.  Clark, supra note 50, at 1804.   
 56.  Id. (quoting DIETRICH RUESCHMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN GERMANY AND IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1973)) (quotation 
omitted).     
 57.  Korioth, supra note 51, at 89 (citing STUDIERENDE AN HOCHSCHULEN WINTERSEMESTER 
2003/2004 FACHSERIE 11 REIHE 4.1- 2004 DSES STATISTISCHEN BUNDESAMTES, available at 
http://www-ec.destatis.de/csp/shop/sfg/bpm.html.cms.cBroker.cls?cmspath=struktur, 
vollanzeige.csp&ID=1014818).    
 58.  Id. (citing STATISTIK JURASTUDENTEN, PRÜFUNGEN, RECHTSANWÄLTE DER 
BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSKAMMER, available at http://www.brak.de/seiten/08_02.php).   
 59.  Law (or, more specifically, the economic and social value system embodied in the 
American legal mainstream of the late twentieth century) has long been one of the New World’s 
most successful exports, but now it seems that portions, at least, of the Old World are also 
uncritically importing our surfeit of lawyers per capita. 
 60.  Korioth, supra note 51, at 89. 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/5
FISHER AA 1.11.10.DOC 1/14/2010  12:19 PM 
2010] EDUCATION FOR JUDICIAL ASPIRANTS 177 
2. France 
The French system is somewhat different, embodying not only a 
corps of “professional” judges but also a variety of tribunals employing 
non-professional judges, many of whom have not received any formal 
legal training (e.g., the civil servants who are judges of the 
administrative courts, the business people appointed to the commercial 
courts, and the miscellaneous lay people who serve on labor courts).61  
Confining ourselves for present purposes to the corps of “professional” 
judges (magistrats), these are career judicial officers, drawn from law 
graduates, who by age 28 have matriculated, based on their performance 
on a highly competitive examination, into the École Nationale de 
Magistrature (National College of Judges) and have embarked upon a 
civil service career.62   
Comparative law studies have observed the rather formalist nature 
of French judicial discourse, which seeks to minimize judicial power, 
emphasize the establishment of clear, predictable rules, and maximize 
the power of the legislature; these studies have contrasted those features 
with the American approach, in which judicial discourse is more 
pragmatic (or realist), takes as its point of departure a recognition of the 
foibles of the legislature—particularly its inability to foresee the 
multifarious legal and factual scenarios that will challenge, if not 
confound, the interpretation of statutory law—and thus empowers judges 
to preserve the slow, accretive, common-law case-by-case lawmaking 
role based on frequently policy-laden applications of logic and 
precedent.63   
This fundamental difference is perhaps a reflection of the 
divergences in Enlightenment thought on the judicial role as between 
Montesquieu and the Federalists.  Montesquieu saw the power of the 
state divided between the executive (the King) and the legislature but not 
the judiciary, which he saw as merely effecting the will of the legislature 
by application of statutory provisions to particular disputes.64  From 
Montesquieu’s point of view, the judiciary should be “invisible et 
 
 61.  See John Bell, Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1757, 1760-61 (1988). 
 62.  Id. at 1759.  See also Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-Election, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at A1. 
 63. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968); JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE 
CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1968).   
 64. MELVYN RICHTER, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF MONTESQUIEU 246 (1977). 
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nulle.”65  This formalistic approach, still evident in the organization and 
philosophy of the French judiciary today,66 undoubtedly derives in no 
small part from French fear of judicial despotism and the revolutionary 
reaction against the parlements of the ancien régime.67  By contrast, the 
Federalists, while viewing the judiciary as weaker than the two political 
branches, anticipated an active, central, and essential role for judicial 
review as protecting not only the fundamental rights of the people (those 
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights) from encroachment by the states, but 
the rights of the states and the people from encroachment by the federal 
government.68  As Alexander Hamilton cogently observed, “[t]he 
complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a 
limited Constitution . . . , courts of justice, whose duty it must be to 
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.”69   
 
 65. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 72-96 (Anne M. 
Cohler et al. eds., 1989).  
 66. See, e.g., RENÉ DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES & METHODOLOGY 27 
(M. Kindred trans. 1972).   
 67. See Charles Calleros, Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, and Clauses Pénales in 
Contract Actions: A Comparative Analysis of the American Common Law and the French Civil 
Code, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 67, 94 (2006); Amalia Kessler, Book Review: Revisiting the Question 
of French and American Difference, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 327, 328 (2006) (reviewing MICHEL 
DE S.- O.- L’E SASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL 
TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004)). 
 68.  Courts are “the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments.”  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. Kessler, eds. 
1999).  See generally Keith R. Fisher, Towards A Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National 
Bank Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y  981, 1017-23 
(2006).   
 69.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter & Charles R. 
Kessler, eds. 1999).   
In the last eight essays of The Federalist (78-85), written for the conclusion of the 
second bound volume, Hamilton dedicated the first six to the judiciary, which he thought 
the most important guardian of minority rights but also the weakest of the three branches 
of government: “It commands neither the press nor the sword.  It has scarcely any 
patronage.”  He was especially intent that the federal judiciary check any legislative 
abuses.  In number 79, Hamilton introduced an essential concept, never made explicit in 
the Constitution: that the Supreme Court should be able to review and overturn 
legislation as unconstitutional.  At Philadelphia, delegates had concentrated on the 
question of state versus federal courts, not whether courts could invalidate legislation.  
Here, Hamilton bluntly affirmed that “no legislative act . . . contrary to the constitution 
can be valid,” laying the intellectual groundwork for the doctrine of judicial review later 
promulgated by Supreme Court justice John Marshall. . . . 
Hamilton revered great judges and in [THE FEDERALIST NO. 79] pondered how the most 
highly qualified people could be recruited and retained by the courts.  He argued for 
adequate salaries and against both age limits and the power to remove judges, except by 
impeachment. 
RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 259 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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3. Japan 
Traditionally, Japanese society viewed litigation—and by extension 
lawyers and judges—with distaste and not with respect.70  Indeed, until 
very recently,71 legal education in Japan was limited to undergraduate 
courses of study72 and was, in all events, fairly stodgy, typically 
featuring large, assembly line73 lecture courses teaching, in the abstract, 
substantive rules of Japanese law and theories of interpretation of 
Japanese legal codes without any actual case analysis or, for that matter, 
classroom participation by students.74  Those actually aspiring to a career 
as lawyer, prosecutor, or judge, while they might take these 
undergraduate law courses, found them inadequate for passing the bar 
and had to enroll, in addition, in various “cram schools,” which entailed 
years of additional study.75   
Admission to practice faces a bottleneck caused by the requirement 
of admission to the Shiho Kenshu Sho, or Legal Research and Training 
Institute (LRTI), a two-year training program consisting of rotations 
between stints in civil and criminal courts and offices of practicing 
attorneys in the private bar.76  Funded by the government and controlled 
by the Saiko saibansho (the Japanese Supreme Court) and the private 
bar,77 the LRTI each year admits only 1,000 of the approximately 30,000 
law graduates taking the bar examination.78    
 
 70.   See Carl F. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan’s Changing View 
Toward Litigation, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 769, 798 (2001). 
 71.  See infra text accompanying notes 82-86.  
 72.  See, e.g., Luke Nottage, Reformist Conservatism and Failures of Imagination in Japanese 
Legal Education, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 16, 32 (2001).   
 73.  See Yoshiharu Kawabata, The Reform of Legal Education and Training in Japan: 
Problems and Prospects, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 419, 432 (2002) (“Most students quickly discover that 
law faculties offer only a series of mass-produced, impersonal lectures with enrollments that exceed 
500 students. Students cannot pass the National Bar Examination by attending these lectures. So 
students who want to become lawyers go to preparatory cram schools and do not bother attending 
university classes.”). 
 74.  See, e.g., Kohei Nakabô, Judicial Reform and the State of Japan's Attorney System: A 
Discussion of Attorney Reform Issues and the Future of the Judiciary, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 
623, 638 (2001) (Yohei Suda trans.) (2001); James R. Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamanaka, The New 
Japanese Law Schools: Putting the Professional into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 
303, 309 (2004).   
 75.  See Setsuo Miyazawa, Education and Training of Lawyers in Japan—A Critical Analysis, 
43 S. TEX. L. REV. 491, 493 (2002); Edward I. Chen, The National Law Examination of Japan, 39 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1989), reprinted in JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 298 (Meryll Dean, 2d ed. 2002).  
 76.  Id. at 299.   
 77.  See Eric A. Feldman, Mirroring Minds: Recruitment and Promotion in Japan's Law 
Faculties, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 467 (1993).   
 78.  See Gerald Paul McAlinn, Reforming the System of Legal Education: A Call for Bold 
Leadership and Self-Governance, 2 ASIAN PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 15, 17-18 (2001).   
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Typically, Japanese judges will have followed this undergraduate 
law degree-cum-cram school route and join the judiciary fresh from their 
training at the LRTI.79  The majority are career judges80 who are 
perceived negatively by the business community because they lack 
business education or work experience and therefore are deemed 
incapable of understanding contemporary business and professional 
practices.81  For these reasons, the business community, acting through a 
group known as the Nippon Keidanren (Japanese Federation of 
Economic Organizations),82 has proposed many far-reaching legal 
reforms in Japan,83 including specifically, a series of judicial reforms 
aimed at making access to the courts easier and less expensive.   The 
goal of these reforms is to create “a civil justice system better able to 
state the contours of the legal versus the illegal, to lessen growing risk 
exposure, and to promote business planning.”84  Among these reforms 
are (i) that graduate professional schools for the study of law be 
established, (ii) that judges be appointed from among practicing 
attorneys who are familiar with the contours of business disputes, and 
(iii) that future judges undertake training in non-legal fields, primarily 
the sciences, in order better to understand intellectual property cases.85  
Although the reform process has already begun, with the opening in 
 
 79.  See George Schumann, Beyond Litigation: Legal Education Reform in Japan and What 
Japan’s New Lawyers Will Do, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 475, 477 (2006) (citing 
Miyazawa, supra note 75, at 493).   
 80.  JOHN O. HALEY, THE JAPANESE JUDICIARY: MAINTAINING INTEGRITY, AUTONOMY AND 
THE PUBLIC TRUST 5 (Faculty Working Papers Series, Paper No. 05-10-01) (Oct. 5, 2005), available 
at http://law.wustl.edu/Uploaded.Files/Faculty/Haley/TheJapaneseJudiciary_SSRN.pdf (noting that 
approximately three-quarters of the judges appointed from the 1970 LRTI graduating class were still 
on the bench in 1996).  
 81.  See Goodman, supra note 70, at 806.   
 82.  This organization, the successor by merger to the Keidanren (Federation of Economic 
Organizations) and the Nikkeiren (Federation of Employers’ Associations), boasts a membership (as 
of May 28, 2009) comprising 1,295 companies, 129 industrial associations, and 47 regional 
economic organizations.  See Nippon Keidanren, About Nippon Keidanren, 
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/profile/pro001.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).   
 83.  THE 21ST CENTURY PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, TOWARD A REVITALIZATION OF THE 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Dec. 22, 1998).  The sponsoring organization is a think tank funded by the 
Keidanren.  The 21st Century Public Policy Institute, http://www.21ppi.org/english/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2009).   
 84.  Luke Nottage, Japan's Impending Reform of the Administration of Justice: Far from 
Final, 48 ASIAWATCH NEWSL. (CCH), Aug. 2001, available at http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/~luken/ 
asiawatch48.htm.   
 85.  Id. 
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2004 of 68 new graduate schools of law,86 it is far too early to be able to 
assess the results.   
*        *        *  
From this necessarily abbreviated tour of three foreign legal 
systems with targeted education as a prerequisite for judicial office, one 
finds they have little to offer that would recommend adoption of IJE in 
the United States.  To the extent that a specialized program of study is 
designed to create a cadre of judges—a specialized judicial class, if you 
will—it is anathema to our legal system.  Add to that the youth and 
inexperience of those eligible for career judicial positions, and one finds 
foreign law programs to be poor role models for adoption of IJE in the 
United States.    
The vitality of the American common law system is its flexibility 
and adaptability to changes in society, technology, and broad legal 
trends.  To be sure, a fair degree of bureaucratization of the judiciary has 
already occurred during the latter half of the twentieth century in 
response to a variety of historical and cultural phenomena, including the 
emergence of the administrative state, huge escalation in crime, and an 
explosion of civil litigation that has largely overwhelmed judicial efforts 
at docket control.87  Further bureaucratization would be distinctly 
unhealthy.  In our republican form of government, bureaucratization of 
the executive and legislative branches, which derive their power and 
legitimacy directly from the will of the people, has shown a tendency to 
insulate those officials in a manner that has impaired their 
responsiveness to societal problems.88  In the case of the judiciary, 
bureaucratization impairs the ability of judges to hear all grievances, 
identify and pay attention to all of the interests involved, and render 
timely, reasoned decisions based on existing laws and precedents.  That 
impairment threatens to corrode the judicial process itself, which lies at 
the heart of the legitimacy of the judicial branch.   
 
 86.  See, e.g., Eriko Arita, Sixty-Six Institutions Win Approval to Open U.S.-Style Law 
Schools, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8610293 at *1.  The number of 
schools was subsequently increased from 66 to 68.  Ichiko Fuyuno, Japan Grooms New Lawyers, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2004, at A18.   
 87.  See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1442 
(1983) [hereinafter Fiss, Bureaucratization].  See generally Normative Controversies Underlying 
Contemporary Debates About Civil Justice Reform: A Way of Talking About Bureaucracy and the 
Future of the Federal Courts, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 217, 220-21 (1998) (summarizing legal 
scholarship on the bureaucratization of the judiciary). 
 88.  See Fiss, Bureaucratization, supra note 87, at 1443. 
19
Fisher: Education for Judicial Aspirants
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
FISHER AA 1.11.10.DOC 1/14/2010  12:19 PM 
182 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:163 
B. Fundamental Change in the Role of the Trial Judge 
If the experience of foreign legal systems provides no principled 
basis for IJE, we must look for one elsewhere.  One possibility is 
contained in the Report of the ABA Commission on the 21st Century 
Judiciary, which suggests that the role of the trial judge has 
fundamentally changed.89  If that is so, then some sort of IJE might well 
be advisable in order to adapt judges to their new functions.  In support 
of the claim of fundamental change in the role of trial judges, the Report 
cites the following: 
• “The term ‘trial judge’ is increasingly becoming a contradiction in 
terms as fewer cases go to trial in state or federal courts.”90   
• “The time, expense, and unpredictability of trials have made 
negotiated or judge-brokered settlements and alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms increasingly attractive, . . . [resulting in] a 
‘brain drain’ for jurists who leave the bench to become mediators 
or arbitrators.”91   
• As a corollary to the above, the role of the judge has changed “from 
someone who dispassionately tries cases to someone who rolls up 
her sleeves and helps the parties to resolve their dispute by means 
short of trial.”92   
• Finally, there has been a move toward “problem-solving courts” to 
cope with various intractable societal problems, such as drug 
addiction and substance abuse, mental illness, domestic violence, 
prostitution, and shoplifting.93  Typical characteristics of such 
“problem-solving” approaches are increased judicial monitoring of 
offenders whose sentences have not involved incarceration, more 
aggressive use of off-site scientists and social-service providers, 
and community outreach.94   
 
 89.  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 47-50 (2003) [hereinafter “21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY REPORT”], 
available at http://www.abanet.org/barserv/library/n/judiciary_and_the_courts/4543.pdf.   
 90.  Id. (citing Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., October 2002, at 24).  
See also Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 
1405-07 (2002) (expressing “concerns over trial numbers” and noting a “decline in trials” and an 
“attending decline in participation of lay citizens . . . in our justice system”); Leonard Post, Federal 
Tort Trials Continue a Downward Spiral, 27 NAT’L L.J., Aug. 22, 2005, at P7 (quoting Professor 
Stephen Burbank as observing that “federal judges now give more attention to case management 
and non-trial adjudication than they give to trials,” and “it is quite clear that ‘trial’ judges ought to 
spend more time on that activity from which the name is taken”).   
 91.  21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 89, at 47.   
 92.  Id.   
 93.  Id. at 48.   
 94.  Id.   
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To begin with, many of these assertions are made largely on the 
basis of anecdotal evidence, which makes evaluation of their validity 
difficult.  The substance of these assertions is important, however, so 
solid empirical research would be valuable and is badly needed.  Even 
assuming the accuracy of these assertions, however, does not lead 
ineluctably to the far-reaching conclusion that the role of trial judges95 
has fundamentally changed.  Although research to support this point 
would be helpful, intuitively it seems unlikely—even if, as a result of 
concerns over overburdened dockets in the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. 
district judges try fewer civil cases than they did thirty or forty years 
ago96—that trial judges today try fewer cases than their forebears of a 
century ago.  Any number of factors may have contributed to a change in 
profile of federal court dockets and led to trial of fewer civil cases as a 
result of combining the mandate of the Speedy Trial Act97 with the 
proliferation of criminal matters, and the average number of cases tried 
per judge may be lower solely as a percentage of the overall docket.   
These phenomena, it should be noted, have been documented 
primarily with regard to the federal system,98 and not without harsh 
 
 95.  It bears mention that no claim has been advanced that the role of appellate judges has 
changed.  Unless IJE were to be confined to those aspiring only to the trial bench, the curriculum 
would have to accommodate all levels of the judiciary.   
 96.  See AMERICAN COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, THE “VANISHING TRIAL”: THE COLLEGE, 
THE PROFESSION, THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at 4-5 (2004) (observing that “[t]he number of civil 
trials in federal court over the 40 years from 1962-2002 has fallen, both as a percentage of filings 
and in absolute numbers. . . . These numbers are particularly startling in light of the enormous 
increase in litigation over the same 40 year period”).  See also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: 
An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 459 (2004); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2005).  But cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: 
The Limits of Data and Inference in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing 
Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571, 571-87 (2004) (cautioning against 
exaggerating our ability reliably to draw causal inferences from currently available data); John 
Lande, “The Vanishing Trial” Report: An Alternative View of the Data, DISP. RESOL. MAG., 
Summer 2004, at 19, 19-21 (disputing the accuracy of the common perception that decrease in trial 
rates is attributable to an increase in ADR and arguing that more research is necessary to determine 
if there is a causal connection).   
 97.  18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2008).   
 98.  Movement toward a culture of devoting increased federal judicial resources to promoting 
settlements and alternative dispute resolution originated with former Chief Justice Warren Burger.  
See, e.g., Chief Justice Highlights Needs and Achievements in Year-End Report, THIRD BRANCH, 
Feb. 1984, at 1, 10 (referring to an earlier report of the Federal Judicial Center calling for increased 
use of arbitration); Martin J. Newhouse, Some Reflections on ADR and the Changing Role of the 
Courts, BOSTON BAR J., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 15, 17 (noting that “former Chief Justice Burger has 
consistently been a vocal advocate of ADR”).  Promotional efforts in this direction increased during 
the tenure of Judge William Schwarzer as Director of the Federal Judicial Center.  See, e.g., William 
W. Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge’s Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978).  See 
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criticism from academia (particularly from Professor Owen Fiss),99 but 
considerably more research and data are needed with respect to the 
myriad of functions performed by state trial courts.100  Indeed, there has 
been some, but very little, evidence of diminution in the work of state 
trial courts,101 and the trial of contested cases remains the key function of 
judges today as in yesteryear.   
The “brain drain” phenomenon identified by the 21st Century 
Report102 does not denote any fundamental alteration in the trial judge’s 
role and is not,103 in fact, limited to trial judges but encompasses 
appellate judges as well.  It is more likely simply a consequence of the 
disparity in pay between the judiciary and the practicing bar,104 and of 
other repercussions of inadequate legislative funding of the judiciary 
(both federal105 and state106).   
 
also D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 93 (Fed. 
Judicial Ctr. ed., 1986) (criticizing academics and praising “[s]ettlement-oriented judges” who have 
a “fundamental commitment to enhancing settlement opportunities in federal courts”).   
 99.  E.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (asserting 
movement away from litigation-centered legal education to alternative dispute resolution “rest[s] on 
questionable premises”).  See Fiss, Bureaucratization, supra note 87, at 1443 (contending 
“bureaucratization” of the judiciary “tends to corrode the individualistic processes that are the 
source of judicial legitimacy”).  See also David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A 
Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 150-
52 (1981) (arguing that to the extent “that the trend toward administration alters the traditional mode 
of adjudication, it may threaten the effectiveness of the courts”).   
 100.  There have been some studies, now largely dated, of declining trial rates in certain 
counties (predominantly rural) in Illinois, see Stephen Daniels, Continuity and Change in Patterns 
of Case Handling: A Case Study of Two Rural Counties, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 381 (1985), 
Missouri, see generally WAYNE MCINTOSH, THE APPEAL OF CIVIL LAW (1990), and California, see 
Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San 
Benito Counties, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 267 (1975).  These studies are, as Sherlock Holmes would 
say, “suggestive,” but considerably more detailed and up-to-date research is needed.   
 101.  The dubiety of any significant diminution in tried cases is underscored by statistical 
evidence reported by the National Center for the State Courts (NCSC), showing an increase in civil 
and criminal filings between 1977 and 1981 of 23 percent and 29 percent, respectively, and a 
similar increase between 1984 and 2000 of 30 percent and 46 percent, respectively, together with an 
increase during the latter period of 66 percent in juvenile filings and 79 percent in domestic 
relations filings.  See 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 89, at 39-40 (citing NCSC 
statistics).   
 102.  21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 89, at 36.  See also infra note 105. 
 103.  See id. at 47 (discussing the changes in the trial judge’s role). 
 104.  In 2008, the annual salary for a first-year associate at a top-tier Boston firm was an 
astounding $165,000.  See generally, NALP Directory of Legal Employers, 
http://www.nalpdirectory.com/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
 105.  The 21st Century Judiciary Report recognizes this.  21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY REPORT, 
supra note 89, at 35-36, 47.  On the disparity in pay, both Chief Justice Roberts and his predecessor, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, have been sounding the tocsin for twenty years now, but no one in 
Congress has paid heed.  See, e.g., John G. Roberts, Jr., 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal 
Judiciary 3 (Jan. 1, 2007), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-
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On the other hand, the “rolling up one’s sleeves” and “problem-
solving courts” phenomena—certainly probative (if any proof were 
needed!) of the lengths to which overworked, underpaid judges will go 
to manage their crowded (if not gridlocked) dockets and minimize, to the 
extent they are able, the number of cases that will take up scarce in-court 
adjudication time—does suggest some changes in trial court function.  
Whether these rise to the level of fundamental change must await further 
research.   
Thus, unlike the experience of foreign judicial education programs, 
it is possible that recent alterations in the role of trial judges support the 
notion of IJE.  As yet, however, there is no plerophory.  To make a truly 
convincing case requires recognition of something even closer to home, 
something that is at once apodictic and vital to the very legitimacy of the 
judiciary.  That something is the people’s perception of the fairness and 
impartiality of the courts.   
C. Declining Public Confidence in the Judiciary 
A variety of articles107 and surveys108 have from time to time 
revealed significant variations in these public perceptions among racial 
and ethnic groups.  A 1992 survey of California residents and attorneys 
yielded an aggregate negative rating of the California court system 
 
end/2006year-endreport.pdf.  Relative remuneration of federal judges has continued to deteriorate.  
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has estimated that the real pay of federal judges has 
declined since 1969 by almost 24 percent, while the real pay of the average American worker during 
that time has increased by almost 18 percent.  Id. at 3.  Thirty-eight federal judges left the federal 
bench (left, not retired) in the past six years alone, 17 of them in the past two years.  Id. at 6.   The 
Chief Justice’s Annual Reports continue to sound the alarm, though seemingly to little avail.  See 
John G. Roberts, Jr., 2008 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary 8 (Jan. 1, 2009) (decrying 
congressional failure to enact federal judicial pay raises or even a cost-of-living increase such as is 
given to every federal employee, including members of Congress themselves), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2008year-endreport.pdf.  
 106.  See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE COST OF JUSTICE: BUDGETARY THREATS TO 
AMERICA’S COURTS (2006), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/ 
The_Cost_of_Justice_Budgetary_Threats_to_America’s_Courts.pdf.    
 107.  See, e.g., R. William Ide, III, Eradicating Bias in the Justice System, A.B.A. J., Mar. 
1994, at 8 (noting minorities’ lack of faith in the judiciary); H.T. Smith, Toward A More Diverse 
Judiciary, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 8 (urging increased attention to diversity on the bench);  
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State 
Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 119-28 (1997) (arguing that the impartial judge mandate of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires racial diversity on the bench); Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, 
Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (2003) (questioning how the public can 
repose confidence and trust in the judiciary if the communities it is supposed to protect are excluded 
from its ranks).   
 108.  See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.   
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among 52 percent of those surveyed;109 further disaggregating those 
data, the percentage of African-Americans rating the court system as 
“poor” amounted to 47 percent (as compared with a 17 percent “poor” 
rating among all those surveyed).110  A 1999 NCSC-sponsored survey 
showed the following breakdown among those responding “strongly 
agree” to the proposition that “[j]udges are generally honest and fair in 
deciding cases”: 34 percent among non-Hispanic whites, 29 percent 
among Hispanics, and 18 percent among African-Americans;111 indeed, 
nearly 70 percent of African-Americans believed that courts treated 
black people worse than whites and Hispanics, a proposition with which 
40 percent of whites and Hispanics agreed.112  That same year, a joint 
A.B.A. Journal–National Bar Association Magazine survey of lawyers 
reported that more than half of African-American attorneys strongly 
believed that racial prejudice exists in the courts and more than half of 
white attorneys believed that “some” racial prejudice exists there.113   
Finally, a 2001 survey conducted by the Justice at Stake Campaign 
yielded similar results: 85 percent of African-Americans believed that 
there is different justice for the rich than for the poor, 55 percent of them 
believed that judges are not fair and impartial (as compared with 62 
percent of whites surveyed who believed that judges are fair and 
impartial), and only 43 percent of African-Americans surveyed (as 
compared with 67 percent of whites) believed that judges are committed 
to the public interest.114 
The Supreme Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that the 
judiciary’s legitimacy and efficacy derives largely from the public’s 
confidence in its fairness and fidelity to the law.115  In recent years, large 
 
 109. Among those surveyed, 35 percent rated the courts only “fair,” and 17 percent rated them 
“poor.”  See David B. Rottman, What Californians Think About Their Courts: Highlights from a 
New Survey of the Public and Attorneys, CAL. COURTS REV., Fall 2005, 6, 6.   
  In fairness, it should be noted that a more recent survey in California shows marked 
improvement in public perception of the courts there.  As compared with 52 percent negative 
opinions overall in 1992, 67 percent of those surveyed in 2005 gave a positive response 
(“excellent,” “very good,” or “good”), and the percentage of African-Americans expressing the 
most negative evaluation (“poor”) declined from 47 percent in 1992 to 18 percent in 2005.  Id. at 7.   
 110. Id.   
 111.  See generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE 
STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999).   
 112.  Id.   
 113.  See Terry Carter, Divided Justice, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 43.   
 114.  Justice at Stake Campaign, National Survey of American Voters (2002), available at 
http://faircourts.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf.  
 115.  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999) (a state court’s “legitimacy derives 
from fidelity to law”); United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (“The legitimacy of the 
Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship.”); Valley 
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campaign expenditures have become a virtual prerequisite for election to 
state judicial office.  To meet this demand, judicial candidates 
increasingly depend on large contributors.116  These elections are no 
longer “low key affairs, conducted with civility and dignity,”117 but 
involve highly reported, politicized campaigns marked by million-dollar 
budgets and heated competition.  This massive influx of money may 
pose a threat of judicial impropriety, both actual and apparent. 
A substantial majority of the public—often 80 percent or higher—
believes that campaign contributions influence judicial decisions, 
according to a variety of surveys conducted at both the national118 and 
the state119 level.  Tellingly, many state court judges feel the same way:  
 
Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 
(1982) (“public confidence [is] essential” to the judicial branch) (quoting United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).  See also Caperton v. A.T. Massey 
Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. at 2266-67 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).   
 116.  This phenomenon is not limited to state high court elections. Candidate fundraising is 
also on the rise in elections for trial and intermediate appellate judgeships.  For example, two 
candidates running for an Illinois intermediate appellate court judgeship in 2006 quadrupled the 
previous state record by raising a combined $3.3 million.  See LAUREN JONES, JAMES SAMPLE & 
RACHEL WEISS, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 24 (Justice at Stake Campaign ed., 
2006), available at http://www.gavelgrab.org/wp-content/resources/ 
NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf.  Fundraising records will continue to be broken as more 
interest groups do the same mental calculus candidly acknowledged by an Ohio AFL-CIO official: 
“[W]e figured out a long time ago that it's easier to elect seven judges than to elect 132 legislators.”  
J. Christopher Heagarty, The Changing Face of Judicial Elections, N.C. ST. B. J. 19, 20 (2002).   
 117.  Richard Briffault, Public Funds and the Regulation of Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L. 
REV. 819, 819 (2002) (quoting Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One 
“Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995)).   
 118.  Michael Hennessy & Bruce Hardy, The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University 
of Pennsylvania, Public Understanding of and Support for the Court:  
Judicial Survey Results (2007), available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/ 
Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Judicial_Findings_10-17-2007.pdf (finding that 69 percent of 
the public “thinks that raising money for elections affects a judge’s rulings to a moderate or great 
extent.”); Christian W. Peck, Zogby International (commissioned by The Committee for Economic 
Development), Attitudes and Views of American Business Leaders on State Judicial Elections and 
Political Contributions to Judges (2007), available at http://www.ced.org/images/content/events/ 
judicial/zogby07.pdf (finding that 79 percent of business executives believe “campaign 
contributions have an impact on judges’ decisions, and more than 80 percent of African-Americans 
express this view, including 51 percent believing that judicial election contributions carry a “great 
deal” of influence).     
 119.  Texas:  Sup. Ct. of Tex., State Bar of Tex. & Tex. Office of Ct. Admin., The Courts and 
the Legal Profession in Texas: The Insider’s Perspective: A Survey of Judges, Court Personnel, and 
Attorneys (1999) (finding that 83 percent of Texans believe money has an impact on judicial 
decisions); Texans for Public Justice, Pay to Play: How Big Money Buys Access to the Texas 
Supreme Court (2001), available at http://www.tpj.org/docs/2001/04/reports/paytoplay/index.htm 
(finding Texas Supreme Court 750 percent more likely to grant discretionary petitions for review 
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A 2002 national survey of elected state judges showed that 22 percent of 
them believe campaign contributions have at least some influence on 
judge’s decisions, and another 4 percent believe such contributions have 
a great deal of influence.120  
One can distill, from several elements identified by researchers to 
be of key importance to such popular perceptions, some basic themes 
vital to the ongoing legitimacy of the judiciary.  First, judges must treat 
those who come before them with dignity and respect.121  Second, there 
 
filed by contributors of at least $100,000 than by non-contributors, and 1,000 percent more likely to 
grant them for contributors of $250,000 or more).   
  Pennsylvania:  Lake Sosin Snell Perry & Associates (commissioned by The Pennsylvania 
Special Commission to Limit Campaign Expenditures), Banners from a Survey of 500 Registered 
Voters in the State of Pennsylvania (1998) (finding that voters “overwhelmingly agree that the 
amount of money in elections and campaigns has caused them to lose a great deal of faith in the 
political system”), available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/NR/rdonlyres/46DA48F0-A7B1-
436C-BF9C-66DF7BF6E3CF/0/sclce.pdf.  See also Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice for Sale, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25 (noting that nine out of ten Pennsylvanians regard judicial fund raising 
as evidence that justice is for sale).   
  Ohio:  T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors, CLEV. PLAIN 
DEALER, Feb. 15, 2000, at 1A (reporting 1995 Ohio survey where 90 percent of respondents 
believed campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions).  See also Adam Liptak and Janet 
Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1 (finding 
that Ohio’s Supreme Court justices “routinely sat on cases after receiving campaign contributions 
from the parties involved or from groups that filed supporting briefs,” and  “voted in favor of 
contributors 70 percent of the time.” 
  Louisiana:  Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An 
Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 1291 (2008) (showing striking statistical bias toward contributors by state supreme court 
justices over fourteen-year period).  Note, however, that the methodology of this study has 
subsequently been called into question.  See Robert Newman, Janet Speyrer & Dek Terrell, A 
Critique of “The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the 
Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function” (2008), available at 
http://www.lasc.org/press_room/press_releases/2008/Critique_of_Tulane_Law_Review.pdf; E. 
Phelps Gay & Kevin R. Tully, Rebuttal of  The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical 
and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function (2008), available 
at http://www.lasc.org/press_room/press_releases/2008/Rebuttal_Revised.pdf.   This contretemps 
was evidently of sufficient magnitude as to engender a letter of apology from the Dean of the 
Tulane Law School to the Justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court.  See Letter from Lawrence 
Ponoroff to Hon. Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. et al. (Sept. 10, 2008), available at http://www.lasc.org/ 
press_room/press_releases/2008/AR-TU_APOLOGY_LETTER.pdf.    
 120.  Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc. (commissioned by the Justice at Stake 
Campaign), Justice at Stake—State Judges Frequency Questionnaire (2001-2002) 5, available at 
www.gqrr.com/articles/1617/1411_JAS_judges.pdf.  
 121.  State bar associations and judicial conduct commissions often collect detailed 
information about bad judicial behavior, though most of the time this information is never made 
public.  There have been, however, some notable exceptions.  See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, 
Pataki Choice for Judgeship is Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003, at B1 (regarding nomination of 
state court judge Dora Irizzary to the federal district bench, bar association comments included 
“[s]tatements that Judge Irizzary was gratuitously rude and abrasive and demeaned lawyers, that she 
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must always be full and fair opportunities for litigants to present their 
cases.  Third, we must have neutral decision-making by fair, honest, and 
impartial judges,122 who have the sense to recuse themselves in 
situations, such as cases involving litigants who are substantial campaign 
contributors, where the appearance of impartiality has been tarnished.123  
Fourth, minority perceptions would be enhanced not only by 
demonstrable impartiality of individual jurists but also a kind of 
structural impartiality achieved by a greater percentage of minority 
faces124 in judicial robes.  In short, the public demands fairness and 
impartiality, both actual and perceived, and both substantive and 
procedural.  As Justice Frankfurter cogently observed in another context, 
“justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”125 
Survey results show that the public, and particularly certain 
identifiable segments thereof, perceive the judiciary as failing to live up 
to these reasonable expectations.126  Given these perceptions—and these 
disparities—there is certainly a case to be made for educating judges to 
conduct the business of the courts in a manner that not only lives up in 
fact to the ideals that lend legitimacy to the judiciary and judicial 
decisions, but also dispels any significant public perceptions (or 
misperceptions, as the case may be) of biased or unequal justice.   
IV.  TOWARDS AN IJE CURRICULUM 
In crafting a potential curriculum for IJE, one is faced with two 
preliminary issues.  First, the program cannot realistically differentiate 
between courses appropriate for the trial bench versus those for the 
 
flew off the handle in a rage for no apparent reason and screamed at attorneys, that she was 
impatient and did not fully listen to attorneys’ legal arguments, and did not have a good grasp of the 
legal issues presented to her.”); Recommendations for Judicial Retention, Colorado State Bar, 2000 
Evaluation of Judge Adele K. Anderson, available at http://www.cobar.org/static/judges/nov2000/ 
10CNTYaanderson.htm (evaluating a judge as “discourteous and condescending to those appearing 
in her courtroom as well as to staff members” and engaging in “demeaning and harsh treatment of 
individuals appearing in her court without legal counsel.”).    
 122.  See David B. Rottman, What Californians Think About Their Courts: Highlights from a 
New Survey of the Public and Attorneys, CAL. COURTS REV., Fall 2005, at 7-8.   
 123.  Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).   
 124.  Justices O’Connor and White, in their tributes to Justice Marshall, recounted how his 
different perspective enriched the deliberation process.  See generally Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217 (1992); Byron R. White, 
A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215 (1992).  See also Chen, supra note 
107, at 1111-13 (providing statistics on the percentage of minorities among the federal judiciary 
(including bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges) and the California judiciary).   
 125.  Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).   
 126.  See supra note 119. 
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appellate bench.  Obviously, no one who has availed himself of IJE can 
possibly know whether he will ever ascend to the bench, and for those 
who are ultimately selected based on an appointive (as opposed to 
electoral) process, whether the appointment will be at the trial or 
appellate level.  Second, the curriculum should not duplicate the kinds of 
courses that are currently offered—and that it makes sense to offer—to 
individuals who have already been selected for judicial office.   
In his article, Judge Amy suggests an LL.M. degree program as the 
model for IJE.  He justifiably extols the intellectual advantages of an 
academic setting and argues that completion of the requirements for an 
academic degree signal expertise in the subject matter of the 
curriculum.127  No doubt his enthusiasm for this model springs from his 
enormously positive experience at the University of Virginia’s Master of 
Laws in the Judicial Process program.  Such a formal—indeed, 
luxurious—academic blueprint does not, however, seem necessary for 
the more modest goals of a voluntary IJE program aimed at practicing 
lawyers who aspire to, but may never achieve, judicial office.  This can 
readily be seen from the design of the U.Va.  LL.M. program itself, 
which was directed at those who are already sitting judges128 and even 
more particularly at appellate judges, and which had, according to Judge 
Amy, “a three-year format, with two resident summer sessions and a 
thesis requirement.”129  Such a commitment of time and labor, and the 
concomitant exposure to a variety of legal subjects, is entirely 
appropriate to justify the award of an advanced legal degree but 
unrealistic for an IJE program.   
Furthermore, Judge Amy’s point about expertise, while eminently 
sensible in the abstract, seems to overshoot the mark when it comes to 
the considerably more humble goals of IJE.130  Preliminarily, it should 
be noted that even the excellent U.Va.  LL.M. Program did not guarantee 
any particular expertise, because the curriculum varied from year to 
 
 127.  Amy, supra note 38, at 138-39.   
 128.  This is also true for the Dwight D. Opperman Institute of Judicial Administration at the 
New York University School of Law, which trains not only sitting U.S. judges but also foreign 
judges, and sponsors appellate judges’ seminars, workshops on special topics in the law, the 
Brennan lecture series honoring the state judiciary, and a biennial research conference.  See NYU 
School of Law – Institute of Judicial Administration: Programs, http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/ 
judicial/programs/index.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).  Likewise, the National Judicial College at 
the University of Nevada-Reno is oriented toward the training of sitting judges, both from the 
United States and abroad.  See The National Judicial College - The NJC Experience, available at 
http://www.judges.org/about.html.   
 129.  Amy, supra note 38, at 131.   
 130.  Id. at 137. 
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year.  For example, courses offered in the summer of 2000 included 
“Courts and Social Science,” “Environmental Risks and Scientific 
Evidence,” “European Union Law,” “International Law in American 
Courts,” “American Constitutional History: From Brown to the Present,” 
and “Modern Civil Legal Systems;” offered in the summer of 1999 were 
“American Constitutional History: 1781 to 1861,” “American 
Constitutional History: Reconstruction to Brown,” “Contemporary Legal 
Thought,” “Law and Economics,” and “Legislation.”131  If the case for 
IJE is largely, if not wholly, predicated on sensitizing judicial aspirants 
to the importance of core values of the judiciary, then no particular 
substantive expertise, no courses in European Union law, U.S. 
constitutional history, and civil law systems, and no lengthy residential 
academic program, with or without thesis, are necessary.   
Indeed, much of the formal learning about the craft of 
adjudication—an essential component, to be sure, of being an effective 
judge—is already imparted in the legal academy.  While there has long 
been some dissatisfaction, on the part of the organized bar and others, 
with the apparent disjunction between what students learn in law school 
and what they are capable (or, more to the point, incapable) of doing 
when they enter law practice,132 almost nobody would deny that if 
students learn anything during their three years of law school, it is how 
to read judicial opinions, analyze them, critique them, synthesize them, 
and deconstruct them.  In short, recent American law graduates are far 
more able to perform certain substantive judicial functions than they are 
to draft, interpret, or negotiate contracts and other legal documents.   
The aforementioned canvassing of the literature,133 while not 
unearthing more than a couple of articles pertinent to IJE, did find 
numerous instances of off-the-cuff suggestions (mostly unelaborated) for 
existing judges receiving additional education across a broad spectrum 
 
 131.  See Judges Program, Curriculum and Faculty, http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/ 
prospectives/judges/judges_curriculum.htm (last visited Mar.  26, 2007).  The appellate orientation 
is self-evident.  This website has since been dismantled, because the reputedly excellent LL.M. 
program in Judicial Process sadly has been discontinued as a result of the drying up of sources of 
funding.  Telephone conversation between the author and Ms. Joyce Holt at the University of 
Virginia School of Law LL.M. Program (May 21, 2008).   
 132.  See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: 
NARROWING THE GAP (1992); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like 
a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1991).   
 133.  See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.   
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of topics: more education in health law issues,134 more education in 
environmental law and land use,135 more education in end-of-life 
decision-making (recall the Terry Schiavo imbroglio136), more education 
in business,137 more education about aberrant behavior, mental illness, 
substance abuse, and anger management,138 more education in 
genetics,139 more education in science generally,140 more education in 
statistics,141 more education in intellectual property,142 more education 
 
 134.  See, e.g., Cynthia Honssinger, Robert Ianni & Jeff Millsteen, The Emerging Role of State 
Attorneys General in Public Health Emergencies, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 115, 117 (2005); Gene W. 
Matthews, Georges Benjamin, S. Peter Mills, Wendy Parmet & James J. Misrahi, Legal 
Preparedness for Bioterrorism, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 52, 55 (2002).   
 135.  See, e.g., Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1, 22 (2007) 
(describing efforts of the Foundation for Research on Enviro-Economic Development).   
 136.  See, e.g., Mark C. Miller, When Congress Attacks the Federal Courts, 56 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 1015, 1026 (2006).   
 137.  See, e.g., Stan Bernstein, Susan H. Seabury & Jack F. Williams, The Empowerment of 
Bankruptcy Courts in Addressing Financial Expert Testimony, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 377, 394 
(2006); Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to 
Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 912 (1995).  Cf. John 
D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in State 
Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 232-33 (2001) (noting judicial education program for 
state court judges at the University of Kansas, funded by the Fred C. and Mary R. Koch 
Foundations, emphasizing a law and economics approach to legal analysis).   
  To address this problem, the ABA has recommended, after a study on the subject by an ad 
hoc committee, that specialized business courts should be created in every state.  See Report of the 
ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient 
Judiciary, 52 BUS. LAW. 947 (1997).  Only a few states (not counting Delaware, of course, whose 
courts have an in-depth and highly sophisticated business law jurisprudence) have followed through 
on this suggestion, some on a statewide basis (these states include North Carolina, California, and 
Maryland) and some on only a limited basis (a special commercial calendar in the Cook County 
Court in Illinois, a Special Business Court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the Court of Common Pleas in 
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania), and the Business Litigation Section of the Superior Court in 
Suffolk, Essex, Middlesex, and Norfolk counties in Massachusetts (i.e., in and around Boston).   
 138.  See, e.g., Arline S. Rotman, Commentary on “Empirical and Ethical Problems with 
Custody Recommendations:” A Call for New Family Court Priorities, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 242, 245 
(2005).   
 139.  See, e.g., Joanne Seltzer, Note, The Cassandra Complex: An Employer’s Dilemma in the 
Genetic Workplace, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 411, 470 (1998).   
 140.  See, e.g., Dorothy E. Schmidt, A Dark and Stormy Night: The Mystery of the Missing 
Science in Fingerprint Identification, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 47, 76 (2008); Michelle Mello & Kathryn 
Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of the Field, 96 GEO. L.J. 649, 700 n.251 
(2008) (citing RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor, eds.  2006) (describing program at 
Brooklyn Law School to educate judges on empirical methodology)).   
 141.  See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Teaching Statistics to Judges, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 351 (2002).   
 142.  See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent 
Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1421 & n.22 (2003) (citing A. HOWARD MATZ, WHO CAN 
UNDERSTAND THIS STUFF? HOW AMERICAN COURTS ATTEMPT TO EDUCATE JUDGES AND JURIES 
ABOUT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 14 (2001) (prepared for the International Conference on the 
Rights of Intellectual Property in Cyberspace).   
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about technology,143 more education in ADR,144 more education about 
pro bono initiatives,145 more education in art and aesthetics,146 more 
education in negotiation and settlement,147 more education about child 
abuse,148 more education about gender bias,149 more education about 
addiction,150 more education in capital cases,151 more education in 
international law,152 etc.  While these suggestions were directed toward 
post-judicial education, they provide a glimpse of the multifarious 
agendas for judicial reform that exist and, at the same time, make us take 
a step back and realize that judges cannot be all things to all people.  
Perhaps, in the sixteenth century, it might have been possible for an 
intellectually gifted individual (e.g., Sir Francis Bacon) to have acquired 
virtually encyclopedic knowledge of all published areas of human 
 
 143.  See, e.g., Thomas J. Moyer & Stephen P. Anway, Biotechnology and the Bar: A Response 
to the Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal Environment, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 671, 
719-25 (2007); Erich Taylor, A New Wave of Police Interrogation?  “Brain Fingerprinting,” The 
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 287, 303 n.149 (citing Caryn Tamber, Brave Neuro World, THE DAILY RECORD 
(Baltimore), Dec. 20, 2005).   
 144.  See, e.g., Sam Ledbetter & Chris Thomason, Circuit Court Appointment Commission, 40 
ARK. LAW. 16, 21 (Winter 2005); Brian L. Josias, Burying the Hatchet in Burial Disputes: Applying 
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Disputes Concerning the Interment of Bodies, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1141, 1180 (2004).   
 145.  See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 51 n.299 
(2004).   
 146.  See, e.g., Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 IOWA L. REV. 367, 409 
(1994).    
 147.  See e.g., Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial Settlement Databases: 
Development and Uses, 43 NO.1 JUDGES’ J. 19 (Winter 2004).   
 148.  See, e.g., Myrna S. Rader, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” 
World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009 (2007).   
 149.  See, e.g., Angie Perone, Note, Unchain My Heart: Slavery as a Defense to the 
Dismantling of the Violence Against Women Act, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 115, 116 (2006); 
Kimberly A. Lonsway, Leslie V. Freeman, Lilia M. Cortina, Vicki J. Magley & Louise F.  
Fitzgerald, Understanding the Judicial Role in Addressing Gender Bias: A View from the Eighth 
Circuit Federal Court System, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 205, 228 (2002); Hope Viner Samborn, 
Gender Bias in the Courts: Working Toward Change, A.B.A. PERSP., Winter/Spring 2002, at 4, 6, 
available at http://www.abanet.org/women/PSPGenderBias2.pdf.  
 150.  See, e.g., Lauren Shapiro, An HIV Advocate’s View of Family Court: Lessons from a 
Broken System, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 133, 144 (1998); Barrie L. Becker, Note, Order in 
the Court: Challenging Judges Who Incarcerate Pregnant, Substance-Dependent Defendants to 
Protect Fetal Health, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 257 & n.175 (1991).   
 151.  See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before 
and After McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 52 (2007).   
 152.  See, e.g., Janet Kovin Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: The Glass Is Half Full, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 33-35 (2007); Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How 
Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 38 n.243 (2007).   
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inquiry.  By now those days are long gone, if in fact they ever existed.153  
There are simply too many books, too many fields of inquiry, and too 
much information for any single human being to assimilate.154   
At the same time, we must recognize, as Cardozo did, the 
evolutionary nature of the judicial process: 
The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense 
ephemeral.  What is good in it endures.  What is erroneous is pretty 
sure to perish.  The good remains the foundation on which new 
structures will be built.  The bad will be rejected and cast off in the 
laboratory of the years.  Little by little the old doctrine is undermined.  
Often the encroachments are so gradual that their significance is at first 
obscured.  Finally we discover that the contour of the landscape has 
been changed, that the old maps must be cast aside, and the ground 
charted anew.155  
A model IJE curriculum should focus on primary skills that will be 
essential for aspirants to judicial office.  Many of these skills will prove 
useful to people, especially busy lawyers, in their daily lives, even if 
they never realize (or decide to abandon) their judicial ambitions.  
Indeed, some examples of appropriate areas for training can be gleaned 
by negative inference from reports of disciplinary proceedings against 
judges, while others may be identified merely by common sense.  Thus a 
curriculum could include short courses in:  
• developing listening skills; 
• interpreting body language;156 
 
 153.  Compare the following passage about the training of 19th Century Dutch foreign service 
officers: 
A contrôleur was one of the more junior grades in the Dutch colonial service, presiding 
over a subdivision of a residency known as an afdeling, or department; but junior or no, 
a candidate had to spend four years at the College of Delft and pass with honors a 
rigorous examination that included the Javanese and Malay languages (both very similar, 
to be sure); French, German, and English language and literature; Islamic law, algebra, 
geometry, trigonometry, geology (no doubt helpful to the present task), drawing, land 
surveying and leveling, as well as a host of other disciplines including, for some less 
explicable reason, the subtle mysteries of “Italian book keeping... .” 
SIMON WINCHESTER, KRAKATOA – THE DAY THE WORLD EXPLODED: AUGUST 27, 1883 155 n* 
(2003).   
 154.  We need not, however, be preoccupied with the spectre of judges lacking sufficient 
education or technical training across the broad spectrum of subjects our courts encounter.  In 
appropriate circumstances, judges can always appoint special masters who can bring to bear the 
requisite expertise far more efficiently.    
 155.  BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921).   
 156.  This would be particularly useful for trial judges, as an aid to assessing the credibility of 
witnesses.   
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• judicial demeanor, and the proper treatment of court staff,157 
attorneys,158 litigants,159 witnesses,160 and others;161 
 
 157.  Cf. Fletcher v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958, 963-64 (Cal. 1998) 
(concluding that judge improperly used court staff, law clerk, and public defender for reelection 
campaign purposes); id. at 964 (approving finding that judge engaged in prejudicial misconduct by 
holding court clerk in contempt for refusing to discuss employment matter without union 
representative present); In re McClain, 662 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Ind. 1996) (finding that judge sent 
vulgar letters to secretary employed at courthouse and enclosed a used condom); In re Deming, 736 
P.2d 639, 654 (Wash. 1987) (noting allegations by court personnel of sexual harassment by judge);  
Miss. High Court Orders Judge Reprimanded, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 12, 2001, at 2B 
(reporting on judge accused of verbally abusing court clerks and other county employees); Cheryl 
Reid, Tollefson, Stolz Say They Offer Clear Choice, TACOMA NEWS TRIB., Oct. 12, 2000, at B1 
(reporting on judge who chased court employees down hallway in a rage).  Perhaps the most high-
profile example is that of former U.S. District Judge Samuel B. Kent, who sexually assaulted both 
his case manager and his secretary and who, after lying about those incidents to an investigative 
committee of judges, was prosecuted for obstruction of justice and sentenced, after a guilty plea, to 
33 months imprisonment.  James C. McKinley, Jr., Judge Sentenced to Prison for Lying About 
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2009, at A15.  Judge Kent was subsequently impeached by the 
House of Representatives, see Ashley Southall, House Approves Impeachment Articles Against 
Judge, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2009, at A12, but he resigned from the bench rather than face trial in 
the U.S. Senate, see Bloomberg News, Texas: Impeached Federal Judge Will Step Down, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A12.  For more details on the Kent scandal, see, e.g., John Council, 
Congress Tries to Knock “King” Samuel B. Kent Off His Throne, TEX. LAW., June 8, 2009, at 6.   
 158.  Cf. Fletcher, 968 P.2d at 963 (finding that judge made inappropriate and sexist remarks 
about counsel);  In re Elliston, 789 S.W.2d 469, 480 (Mo. 1990) (noting testimony of sixteen 
attorneys on their personal experiences with abusive judge); Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 655-56 (Wash. 
1987) (removing from office judge who commented on the breasts of one female prosecutor and 
told another “I would really like to jump your bones”); In re Raab (N.Y. Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 
Feb. 3, 2003) (finding persistent pattern of abuse by judge of attorneys), available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/R/raab.htm; Ralph Ranalli, Lopez Resigns, Denies 
Misdeeds; Says Accepting Findings Goes Against Principles, BOSTON GLOBE, May 20, 2003, at A1 
(reporting on notorious case where judge was persistently rude, discourteous, sarcastic, and 
condescending toward prosecutors); Robert Becker, State Ousts Judge, Cites Harassment, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 4, 2001, at 1 (reporting removal from office of judge who sexually harassed four female 
prosecutors).   
 159.  Abuse of defendants unfortunately has a long pedigree in this country, as evidenced by 
the prejudicial and intemperate (indeed, contemptuous) treatment by Justice William Paterson of 
Congressman Matthew Lyon, lawyer Thomas Cooper, journalist Joseph Callender, and others in 
presiding over prosecutions under the Sedition Act of 1798.  See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM  48-64 (2004).  Cf. Fletcher, 968 P.2d at 963 (judge improperly entered judgment 
against nonparty, without affording notice or an opportunity to be heard, because judge subjectively 
thought he “ought to pay”); id. at 971-74, 975-76 (detailing numerous ex parte contacts with 
criminal defendants); Miller, supra note 18, at 444 n.118 (citing Robynn Tysver, Omaha Judge 
Reprimanded for Mistreating Defendants, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 30, 2000, at 13 
(reporting that judge routinely yelled at and berated defendants appearing before him)).   
 160.  Cf. id. at 444 n.119 (citing In re Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603, 603 (Wis. 1989) 
(disciplining a judge for criticizing “victim-witness . . . for crying during cross-examination”)); 
Fletcher, 968 P.2d at 974-75 (detailing judge’s numerous ex parte contacts with witnesses).   
 161.  Cf. Deming,736 P.2d at 653-654 (noting factual findings with respect to judge’s affair 
with probation department employee, attempt to use his office to secure a promotion for that 
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• jury selection and selection of a foreperson;162 
• efficient, but appropriate,163 use of law clerks and staff attorneys;164 
• sensitivity training to help identify and cope with stereotyping and 
latent bias and prejudice, e.g., those based (albeit with some 
overlap in many instances) on race,165 ethnicity,166 religion,167 
gender,168 nationality,169 alienage,170 socio-economic status,171 
 
employee, and sexual advances he made to an intern); Miller, supra note 18, at 444 n.120 & 122 
(citing Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d at 604 (noting that judge criticized state mental health hospital and 
its staff and stated that “he had never found a doctor or any staff person associated with it to be 
qualified”); In re Schwartz, 755 So.2d 110, 111 (Fla. 2000) (publicly reprimanding judge who made 
sarcastic remarks about law professor and denigrated textbook the professor had written)).   
 162.  Cf. Johnson v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 892, 894 (4th Cir. 1990) (showing a judge, in racially 
charged murder trial, who failed to disclose to counsel in camera conversation with juror who 
complained that the white foreperson was saying “[t]he blacks [on the jury] are sticking together,” 
and other remarks suggesting racial prejudice).  The author was counsel to the petitioner in this 
case.   
 163. Cf. Miss. Judicial Performance Comm’n v. Hopkins, 590 So. 2d 857, 858 (Miss. 1991) 
(noting that a judge allowed court clerks to dismiss parking tickets); In re Going (N.Y. Comm’n on 
Jud. Conduct, Dec. 29, 2000) (noting judge’s abusive behavior toward law clerk after termination of 
romantic relationship between them), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/ 
going(2).htm; In re Ward, No. 79 CC-1 (Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., July 10, 1980) (describing allegation 
that judge permitted a court clerk to conduct court calls and enter orders), complaint summary 
available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm; Ann W. O’Neill, Appeals Court Criticizes L.A. 
Judge for ‘Egregious’ Misconduct, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2000, at B3 (reporting public criticism of 
trial judge for allowing law clerk to preside over pretrial conference).   
 164.  Cf. Miller, supra note 158, at 441 n.85 (citing In re Hunter, 823 So. 2d 325, 336 (La. 
2002) (stating that a judge failed to fulfill her duty to supervise her staff); In re Van Susteren, 348 
N.W.2d 579, 579 (Wis. 1984) (taking into account judge’s failure to supervise court personnel for 
prompt and efficient disposition of official business as a factor in a suspension recommendation)).   
 165.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.145 (citing, inter alia, In re Goodfarb, 880 P.2d 620, 
621 (Ariz. 1994) (finding that judge in chambers used the phrase “fucking niggers”); In re Flier 
(Cal. Comm’n on Jud. Performance, May 30, 1995) (finding racial insensitivity in judge’s reference 
to in-custody adult African American as a “good boy”), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/ 
PubAdmRTF/FlierPA_05-30-95.rtf; Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Clamor Grows Over 
Associate Judge, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 1999, § 2, at 1 (reporting that judicial candidate failed to 
disclose that he had committed racial discrimination in jury selection in a murder case when serving 
as a public prosecutor); John Caher, Commuter Tax Fight Next on Court Agenda: Internet Porn, 
Russian Bank Cases Also to Be Heard, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 4, 2000, at 1 (reporting judge’s obscene and 
racially offensive remarks, including reference to a 67-year-old murder victim as “just some old 
nigger bitch”); Mickey Ciokajlo, Judge Accused of Misconduct; State Agency Cites Behavior, 
Remarks in Court, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 2002, at 1 (reporting that judge referred to African 
American as “boy”)).     
 166.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.146 (citing Karen Dorn Steele, Passing Notes: Judge, 
Clerk Make Ethnic Slurs; Investigation Prompts Reprimand, IRE J., Mar. 1, 2002, at 32 (reporting 
judge’s reference to Hispanic Americans as “greasers”)).   
 167.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.147 (citing Fredric U. Dicker, Panel Slams Judge’s 
“Bizarre” Religious Remarks, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2003, at 2 (reporting judge’s slurs directed at 
Jewish lawyer and Catholic schools)).  
 168.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.143-44, 447 n.165 (citing, inter alia, In re Cieslik, No. 
87 CC-2 (Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., July 30, 1987) (reprimanding judge for making “intemperate, rude 
and sexist remarks to women attorneys during official proceedings”), complaint summary available 
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prosecution or defense in criminal cases,172 and attitudes towards 
various  organizations;173 
• identifying and dealing with personality conflicts (e.g., with other 
judges,174  parties,175 or among lawyers, jurors,176 etc.); 
 
at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm;  Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in Queens Courts, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 7, 2003, at 4 (reporting that judge dispensed toothbrushes to “deadbeat 
dads” before packing them off to jail); Michele McPhee, Cases vs. Diamond Dismissed, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 3, 2003, at 35 (reporting complaints of misconduct filed against judge allegedly 
so hostile to men in divorce cases that husbands who had appeared before her formed support 
group); Joe Fitzgerald, Apology Now Would be Too Little, Too Late, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 30, 
2003, at 5 (reporting bias in favor of transgendered individuals by judge who described kidnapping 
and attempted rape of 11-year-old boy by transgendered person as “a low-level offense”)).   
 169.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 446 nn.150-51 & 153 (citing In re Haugner (Cal. Comm’n on 
Jud. Performance, Apr. 11, 1994) (finding that a judge made comments that were insensitive to 
persons of Japanese ancestry and reflected possible racial or ethnic bias), available at 
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Haugner_PubR_041194.doc.; Mary Wisniewski, Watching the 
Watchdogs Watch: The JIB and Courts Commission, CHI. L., Mar. 1999, at 63 (reporting 
disparaging remarks by judges against Danes and Yugoslavians); Feiden, supra note 167, at 4 
(reporting on judge’s Anglophobic tirade against defendant of British ancestry)).   
 170.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.154 (citing H.G. Reza & Christine Hanley, Migrant 
Gets a New Trial; Judge Scolded, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at B1 (reporting that judge displayed 
such overt bias against undocumented aliens that appeals panel found manifest miscarriage of 
justice)).   
 171.  Cf. Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603, 603 (Wis. 1989) (noting that judge berated women with 
minor children for abusing the welfare system); Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.155, 447 n.158 
(citing In re Michelson, 591 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Wis. 1999) (noting panel’s finding that judge’s 
comments demonstrated bias based on socioeconomic status); Alisa Lapolt, Reprimand, Training 
Urged for Racine Judge Over Unwed Mother Remarks, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 2, 1998, at 
3 (reporting judge remarking, “I suppose it was too much to ask that your daughter keep her pants 
on and not behave like a slut.”)).    
 172.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 441 n.90, 445 nn.141-42 (citing, inter alia, In re Duckman, 
677 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (1998) (holding that judge improperly dismissed charges against criminal 
defendants and verbally humiliated prosecutors); Feiden, supra note 167, at 4 (reporting that judge 
told prosecutor who collapsed with chest pains not to “take it so personally”); Ralph Ranalli & 
Joanna Weiss, Friends Say Lopez Will Quit Bench, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2003, at A1 (reporting 
that judge displayed bias against prosecutors); John Caher, Agency’s Authority to Act Under 
“Spargo” Clarified: Prosecutions for Behavior on the Bench May Proceed, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 
2003, at 1 (reporting that judge had been accused of “denying assigned counsel, setting 
unreasonably high bail, coercing guilty pleas, [and] entering convictions against defendants who 
were not before him”); Janan Hanna, Outspoken Judge Will Take Class to Curb Anger, CHI. TRIB., 
May 9, 2002,  at 1 (reporting that judge interrupted defense lawyer’s closing arguments forty-five 
times and suggested that the defense witnesses were thieves and drug addicts); David Rosenzweig, 
Judge Removed From Case Over Remark, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at B1 (reporting that judge 
questioned the credibility of criminal defendants who testified in their own defense)).   
 173.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.149, 447 n.162 (citing Steele, supra note 165, at 32 
(reporting prejudicial remark against labor unions); Stephen Hunt, Remarks by a Judge Upset 
Attorney, ACLU, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 16, 2002, at C1 (reporting prejudicial remarks against 
ACLU); William Kleinknecht, Appeals Court Finds Bias Against Automaker—Cites Judge's 
“Antagonism” in Case of Accident that Left Teen Paraplegic, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), June 4, 
2003, at 41 (reporting prejudice against automobile manufacturers)).   
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• basic techniques of docket management;177 
• basic techniques of managing people, especially those with large 
personalities (including, but not limited to, lawyers) in the 
courtroom and in chambers; 
• balancing the needs of judicial office with pre-existing 
friendships,178 family obligations,179 professional relationships,180 
romantic attachments,181 and affiliations with or memberships in 
religious,182 professional, civic, and community organizations; 
 
 174.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 444 n.126 (citing, inter alia, In re Crawford, 629 N.W.2d 1, 
3-4 (Wis. 2001) (suspending judge who threatened to publicize purported evidence of misconduct 
by chief judge); In re Jones, 581 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Neb. 1998) (removing from office judge who 
engaged in a pattern of serious misconduct, including saying “fuck you” to a fellow judge and 
calling her a “bitch”); In re Velasquez, No. 139 (Cal. Comm’n on Jud. Performance, Apr. 16, 1997) 
(censuring judge who made public statements disparaging fellow judges), available at 
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/VelasquezCNCN_04-16- 97.rtf)).   
 175.  Cf. John Caher, Utterly Inexcusable Acts Prompt Censure of N.Y. Judge, LEG. 
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 2006, at 4 (reporting that N.Y. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct declined to 
suspend Albany city judge who on one occasion “descended from the bench, dropped his robes to 
the floor and seemingly challenged a defendant to a fist fight in court” and on another “suggested 
police officers ‘thump the shit out of’ another allegedly disrespectful individual”).   
 176.  Cf.  Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119 n.2 (1983) (acknowledging, in case where juror 
had two unrecorded, ex parte contacts with trial judge that she was acquainted with murder victim 
of police informant witness, “that the trial judge promptly should have notified counsel for all 
parties after the juror approached him.”); Johnson, 915 F.2d at 897 (noting “it would have been 
preferable for [the trial judge] to have had Johnson and his counsel present during the conversation 
with [the] juror . . . or at least to have recorded the conversation and disclosed its substance to 
Johnson and his counsel.”).  
 177.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 453 n.234 (citing, inter alia, In re Waddick, 605 N.W.2d 
861, 862-63, 868 (Wis. 2000) (suspending judge for falsely claiming that his docket was up-to-date 
when he was behind on numerous cases); In re Johnson, 692 So. 2d 168, 170, 172 (Fla. 1997) 
(removing from office judge who repeatedly backdated DUI convictions in order to disguise how 
long she was taking to dispose of cases)).   
 178.  Cf. Richard Marosi, State Agency Admonishes Former Judge, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, 
at B4 (reporting public rebuke of judge who improperly released or reduced bail on six criminal 
defendants who were clients of judge’s old friend or the friend’s daughter).   
 179.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 433 n.15, 438 n.64 (citing, inter alia, Wren Propp, Court 
Suspends Mora Magistrate, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 10, 2003, at 6 (reporting suspension of judge 
who dismissed traffic citations on behalf of family and friends); In re Schwartz, No. 01 CC-3 (Ill. 
Jud. Inquiry Bd., Nov. 30, 2001) (discussing case of judge who allegedly pressured the Southern 
Illinois University School of Law to admit his stepson and, when the application was denied, 
retaliated by banning students from the school’s clinic from representing clients in his court), 
complaint summary available at http:// www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm).   
 180.  Cf. Miller, supra note 18, at 450 n.200 (citing, inter alia, In re Durr, No. 72 CC-1 (Ill. 
Jud. Inquiry Bd., Aug. 1, 1973) (suspending judge for failing to disclose to litigants that opposing 
counsel was judge’s business partner), complaint summary available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/ 
summary.htm)).   
 181.  Cf. Deming, 736 P.2d at 653-54 (detailing judge’s attempt to use his office improperly to 
secure career advancement for paramour); Miller, supra note 18, at 436 n.47 (citing In re 
Chrzanowski, 636 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Mich. 2001) (involving judge who appointed her paramour to 
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• some of the fine points of judicial ethics;183 
• balancing judicial independence and judicial restraint; 
• financial planning: how to “afford” to be a judge;184 
• public perceptions and the importance of judicial decorum;185 
• dealing with threats to personal safety and security and that of court 
personnel and loved ones;186 
 
represent indigent criminal defendants at state expense without disclosing relationship to opposing 
counsel)).   
 182.  Cf. Fletcher v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958, 971 (Cal. 1998) 
(involving judge who encouraged defendant in family law matter to attend a religious men’s 
fellowship meeting at judge’s own house, during which the defendant’s personal problems became a 
focal point for discussion).   
 183.  Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 107-17 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rebuking 
U.S. district judge who had presided over Microsoft antitrust trial for “deliberate, repeated, 
egregious, and flagrant” talking with reporters about the case); In re Buckson, 610 A.2d 203, 205-06 
(Del. Jud. 1992) (censuring and removing from office for “persistent” and “wilful” misconduct 
judge who, without resigning his position, publicly announced he was seeking his party’s 
nomination for governor); Miller, supra note 18, at 450 n.200, 452 n.215, (citing, inter alia, In re 
Forde, No. 96-311 (Ark. Jud. Discipline and Disability Comm’n, Sept. 22, 1998) (finding violation 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct where judge failed to disclose that he leased office space to an 
attorney who appeared before him), available at http:// www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/ 
Ford96.311.pdf; In re Chirlin (Cal. Comm’n on Jud. Performance, Aug. 28, 1995) (involving trial 
judge who, after presiding over breach of contract action between actress and movie studio in which 
the studio prevailed, but while the matter was on appeal, attended premiere of film and post-
premiere reception as studio’s guest), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/ChirlinPA_08-28-
95.rtf).   
 184.  See supra notes 104-106. 
 185.  Cf. Scott Glover, Judge Grants a Stay After Conceding He Maintained His Own Website 
with Sexually Explicit Images, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2008, at 1 (reporting that Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, who was presiding as a trial judge in an obscenity case, 
acknowledged posting sexual content on his personal website, including “a photo of naked women 
on all fours painted to look like cows and a video of a half-dressed man cavorting with a sexually 
aroused farm animal.  He defended some of the adult content as ’funny’ but conceded that other 
postings were inappropriate.”).  To his credit, Kozinski recused himself from the obscenity trial 
amidst uproar over the pornographic material on his website.  Scott Glover, U.S. Judge in Obscenity 
Trial Steps Down, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at 1.  See also In re Hamilton, PA. L. WKLY., June 25, 
2007, at D8 (reporting decision that magisterial district judge was subject to discipline for 
provoking a fistfight with a police officer at a local golf club party and then telling the officer’s wife 
to “pick your piece of shit husband off the floor;” court held “reasonable expectations of the public 
would include the expectation that a judicial officer would not act lawlessly in provoking a fistfight  
. . . and then commit assault and battery on a member of the local community”).    
 186.  Cf. Appellate Court Upholds Matt Hale Conviction, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 2006, at C3 
(reporting affirmance of conviction of white supremacist on charges of soliciting murder of federal 
Judge Joan Lefkow).  Judge Lefkow herself was not assassinated, but her mother and husband were, 
and this led to installation of home security systems by the U.S. Marshal’s Service for most federal 
judges in Chicago.  See Jeff Coen, Judges Get Home Security, Lefkow Slayings Spur Expansion of 
Measures to Safeguard Jurists, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 2006, at C1.  Subsequently, however, the 
efforts of the U.S. Marshal’s service have come under harsh attack.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE UNITED STATES MARSHAL’S SERVICE JUDICIAL 
SECURITY PROCESS (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/USMS/e0710/ 
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• determining when recusal is advisable, even where it is not 
mandatory;187 
• balancing First Amendment rights against the needs of judicial 
discretion in election campaigning,188 public speaking, relations 
with news media, and responding to public criticism of decisions.   
The foregoing does not purport to be an exhaustive list; it is merely 
a set of suggestions for discussion and debate on the structuring of a 
pilot IJE program.  Such a program need not be a year-long, formal 
academic curriculum leading to the awarding of an advanced degree but 
can be accomplished in a flexible format, with a maximum anticipated 
duration of one or two weeks, which could be covered in a single session 
(e.g., a summer session) or seriatim in a number of one- to two-day (or 
perhaps even weekend) seminars.  Individual state bar associations are 
well-positioned to sponsor IJE for their membership, and to experiment 
with the structure and content of such programs.  In this way, they can 
 
final.pdf (criticizing lax efforts of U.S. Marshal’s service to improve investigation of threats against 
federal judges and protection of those threatened).   
 187.  This is a subject that has traditionally contained many gray areas.  See, e.g., Leslie W. 
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might Reasonably 
Be Questioned”, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55 (2000); Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: 
Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 UNIV. OF MICH. J. L. REFORM 1017, 1118 n.395 (2004).   
Note that Canon 3(E) of the 1990 version (which remains the version still in force in the several 
states) of the A.B.A.’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3(E) (1990), has been substantively revised in the version approved by the A.B.A. House of 
Delegates on February 12, 2007.  See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.11 (2007).   SCJI 
is currently working on a Judicial Disqualification Project, which, when completed, will have 
surveyed the most significant standards in use across the country and will propose recommendations 
to the ABA House of Delegates for endorsement.   
  The Supreme Court’s granting of certiorari in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-
22, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008), has resulted in a surge of public interest in the special 
problem of recusal relating to judicial election Campaign contributions.  A recent poll, conducted by 
Harris International February 12-15, 2009 on behalf of the Justice at Stake Campaign, found that 81 
percent of those surveyed (slightly in excess of 1000 individuals) believe judges should not decide 
whether they themselves should hear a case, and that when a judge’s impartiality is challenged, 
another judge should weigh the facts.  Some 68 percent would doubt a judge’s impartiality if one 
party to a case had contributed $50,000 to the judge’s election campaign, and that number rose to 
73% if the campaign contribution level were at $1 million.  See 2/22/09: Poll: Huge Majority Wants 
Firewall Between Judges, Election Backers, available at http://www.justiceatstake.org//node/125.    
 188. “When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct campaigns and to raise 
funds in a system designed to allow for competition among interest groups and political parties, the 
persisting question is whether that process is consistent with the perception and the reality of 
judicial independence and judicial excellence.”  N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López-Torres, 552 
U.S. 196, 212 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Cf. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 
765, 788 (2002) (holding that First Amendment prohibits the states from gagging candidates for 
judicial office on issues of public debate); Spargo v. New York State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 
244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 88-90 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (invalidating state judicial conduct regulations 
prohibiting judicial candidates from engaging in political activity).   
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serve Justice Brandeis’ oft-quoted “states as laboratories” function,189 
with the ultimate goal of populating the judiciary of the future with men 
and women who will potentially be more sensitive to the demands and 
responsibilities of serving as a judge, more attuned to the central 
importance of public perceptions of the judiciary as a barometer of the 
legitimacy of judicial review, and more consciously committed to 
fulfilling the ideals of the fair and impartial administration of justice for 
all.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Though by no means free from all doubt and worthy of careful 
scrutiny under the magnifying glass of healthy skepticism, there seems 
to be a persuasive case that can be made for voluntary, additional 
education for lawyers aspiring to, or considering the possibility of 
someday seeking, judicial office.  The goal of such education would be 
to advance the cause of professionalism by improving the overall quality 
of the pool of people seeking election or appointment to the bench.  
Individual state bar associations will be able to take leading roles in 
fashioning the optimal format and curriculum of such a program for their 
individual jurisdictions and fostering the ideals of fair and impartial 
courts that have long been the hallmark of our legal system.   
 
 189.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(noting with approval states serving as laboratories for trying “novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country”).   
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